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I. INTRODUCTION
In the winter of 1908, an Irish immigrant named John Casey walked
into a New York City Supreme Court courthouse for jury duty.1 He was a
big burly man, an ironworker, and was pleased to have been called as a
juror by his adopted city. His family had wished him well as he went out
the door that morning. He was assigned as a juror to a wrongful death case
where the victim was a little girl. As the jury deliberated and deadlocked,
another man on the jury grumbled that he had $6,000 in his pocket and was
eager to leave the courthouse to close an important real estate deal. The jury
could not agree on a proper resolution. The foreman of the jury, an account-
ant, suggested they flip a coin. Unsure of the proper procedure in American
courts, Casey agreed, and the coin came up for the defendant.
As Casey filed out of the jury room with the rest, he had no idea that
he and his fellow jurors were soon to be humiliated in newspapers all across
America for deciding a case in such a way. He had no idea that he was
about to be fined $50 (equivalent to $1,300 in 2018 after adjusting for infla-
tion) for his mistake. He had no idea that he would be dead within months
from chronic renal failure, likely exacerbated by his drubbing in the court of
public opinion. He would die of shame, reported one newspaper, beset by
grief at the thought that he had failed the little girl’s family and his adopted
country. The Casey narrative is just one example of a phenomenon that can
be observed throughout American history.
Trial by jury has been a hallmark of the English and American legal
tradition for centuries. A trial by one’s peers reinforces the notion that jus-
tice will be administered to defendants impartially by a group of community
members who are disinterested. They will be neutral, drawn from the com-
munity at large, and possess “ordinary” sensibilities that will allow them to
divine “truth” from the presentation of facts at trial. Of course, even as the
jury has remained prominent in the justice system of the United States, the
composition of juries has changed markedly. As old prejudices began to
1. See generally infra Part II.B.
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lose the force of law (but not wither away),2 different members of society
began to join the jury pool. Thus, the jury has changed with the United
States as it has grown. This tinkering with the jury system has remained
constant even as the role of the jury has receded, as fewer and fewer cases
proceed to trial.
The debate over the role of juries in our society, far from atrophying, is
still unsettled and contentious. Recently, in the case of Pen˜a-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, the Supreme Court tackled the question of whether to allow ju-
rors to testify as to the racial bias of their co-jurors during deliberations.3
Under the present formulation of the jury system, jurors at the federal level
are only permitted to testify as to the content of their deliberations in very
limited circumstances.4 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that
post-trial juror testimony regarding racial bias was admissible as a judi-
cially articulated exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 606.5 He noted that
racially tinged verdicts have a unique history6 and reiterated that cases
would arise in which faith in the jury system would be sorely tested. In such
cases, exceptions to the no-impeachment rule would have to fall away.7
Living in the shadow of—and sometimes walking hand in hand with—
that history of racially motivated outcomes is another form of defective
verdict. Under the Pen˜a-Rodriguez schema articulated by Justice Kennedy,
a “racially tinged verdict” is an explicit category of undesirableness. Its
2. See generally Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235, 1248
(2016).
3. 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). The rule has three narrow exceptions—in other words, the rule
spells out quite clearly the only circumstances where a juror may testify about the deliberations
that he or she witnessed. The first exception applies where a jury reviewed, received, or used
extraneous prejudicial information. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A); see also Bulletin Displays, LLC
v. Regency Outdoor Advert., Inc., No. SACV 05-1083-CJC(ANx), 2012 WL 12950708, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2012). The second exception applies where an outside influence improperly
influenced the jury; bribery and threats fall under this umbrella. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(B); see
also United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2004). The third and final exception
applies where the jury made a mistake on the verdict form, like entering “Guilty” instead of “Not
Guilty” or incorrectly noting a damage figure. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(C); see also TeeVee
Toons, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). In the context of this paper,
it should be noted that the legislative drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence 606 contemplated the
inclusion of quotient verdicts in the rule and did not. See Pen˜a-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 877 (Alito,
J., dissenting); Reyes v. Seifert, No. 2:01-cv-08666-PA-MAN at *18 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10,
2003).
5. Pen˜a-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a juror makes a clear
statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal
defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to
permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement . . . .”).
6. Id. at 868 (“This Court’s decisions demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique histori-
cal, constitutional, and institutional concerns.”).
7. Id. at 865–66 (“In addressing the scope of the common-law no-impeachment rule before
Rule 606(b)’s adoption, the Reid and McDonald Courts noted the possibility of an exception to the
rule in the ‘gravest and most important cases.’” (citing United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366
(1851); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915))).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-APR-20 11:58
212 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2
ugliness is self-evident, and a competent jurist will reflexively cast it aside.
The line between a verdict based on truth and a verdict premised on what
the community wants has always been porous, if not entirely illusory. This
dissonance is demonstrated by the history of chance verdicts in America,
which explicitly fits the bill of verdicts implicating “unique historical, con-
stitutional, and institutional concerns.”8
So-called “chance verdicts” have appeared in the legal literature under
many different names since the nation’s founding. Some sources speak of
“verdict by lot” or a verdict made with “resort to the determination of
chance.”9 Others speak of “gambling verdicts,” invoking the image of a
vice infringing on the civic realm.10 In short, a chance verdict is a term that
describes several different kinds of juror misconduct, ranging from flipping
a coin to decide a case, to averaging different jurors’ preferred damage
figures.
Chance verdicts are a unique and troubling phenomenon because so
much of what jurors discuss and debate is closed from the view of the jus-
tice system. Attorneys package their cases as neatly as possible, the judge
ensures the proceeding is fair and comports with precedent, and then the
jury makes a decision based on the facts before it. Chance verdicts throw
that process into chaos. Why even bother with a trial if one could simply
flip a coin to decide a dispute or declare a defendant guilty or innocent?11
8. Pen˜a-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868. This paper is not trying to show that the history of
racial animus and chance verdicts are somehow equivalent (nor could it). Rather, this paper uses
the logic of Pen˜a-Rodriguez to assess another area of the law implicating similar concerns. In-
deed, if one understands Pen˜a-Rodriguez as posing a question—how far can juries go?—and then
answering that question as to one dimension of the problem (racist jurors), then this paper seeks to
explore an adjacent, smaller dimension: chance verdicts. In Pen˜a-Rodriguez, Justice Kennedy
noted that, “[j]urors are presumed to follow their oath . . . and neither history nor common experi-
ence show that the jury system is rife with mischief of these or similar kinds.” Id. (emphasis
added). This paper challenges that statement’s reference to history because chance verdicts are
more than a historical curiosity. Understanding their impact and how society responded to them
can only further a rigorous assessment of when one inevitably recurs. Cf. id. at 871 (“It is the mark
of a maturing legal system that it seeks to understand and to implement the lessons of history.”).
9. See, e.g., Mirabito v. S. F. Dairy Co., 1 Cal. 2d 400, 403 (1934).
10. See, e.g., Wilson v. Berryman, 5 Cal. 44 (1855).
11. In 2007, the Virginia Supreme Court removed a Juvenile Court judge for deciding a
custody issue by a coin flip. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n of Va. v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 674
(2007) (“A judge’s act of tossing a coin in a courtroom to decide a legal issue pending before the
court suggests that courts do not decide cases on their merits but instead subject litigants to games
of chance in serious matters without regard to the evidence or applicable law.”). This public
indignation at the use of chance is not limited to the legal field. In a recent season of the popular
show “The Bachelor” in New Zealand, a public uproar ensued when it was revealed that the final
choice was made by a coin toss. See Alex Casey, EXCLUSIVE: Jordan Mauger Flipped a Coin to
Decide the Winner of The Bachelor NZ, THE SPINOFF (Apr. 26, 2017), https://thespinoff.co.nz/tv/
26-04-2017/exclusive-jordan-mauger-flipped-a-coin-to-decide-the-winner-of-the-bachelor-nz
(“Mauger did not make any mention of his methodology on screen, leaving viewers with the
impression that he had followed his heart, rather than a small metal disc.”). In another recent
episode in the public sphere involving coin flips, several police officers were terminated after
flipping a coin to decide whether to arrest or release a driver caught speeding. See Jacey Fortin,
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Conversely, because a coin flip is statistically fair, some commentators
have even proposed integrating lotteries into certain aspects of the judicial
system.12 Chance verdicts make lawyers and the public question how safe
the system of trusting community members with defendants’ fates really is.
If the ideal juror brings good judgment and common sense to a proceeding,
a chance verdict exposes how far away our society is from that ideal. It
makes the whole legal system seem like a pretense to justice rather than a
set of procedures by which justice may be sought and realized.
Pen˜a-Rodriguez and earlier cases contemplated that in unique circum-
stances, jurors could testify as to misconduct so egregious that it shocked
the conscience. A narrower reading of the Pen˜a-Rodriguez decision might
be that because racial animus has a unique and tortured relationship with
historical deprivation of people’s constitutional rights, history should un-
lock the gates of Rule 606(b). This paper posits that pure chance verdicts
(that is, when the jury flips a coin to decide the case)—if not quotient ver-
dicts as well—share some of that taint of mob justice, and thus jurors
should be allowed to testify in federal court as to pure chance verdicts.13
With regard to the state system, this paper seeks to show that chance ver-
dicts occur in a particular social context that will inevitably arise again.14
By tracing the evolution of state statutory and judicial decisions allowing
such testimony—and by closely examining under-explored historical exam-
ples—this paper will argue that the seemingly-odd chance verdict could fit
into the “gravest cases” exception to the no-impeachment rule.
Before an Arrest, Officers Tossed a (Virtual) Coin, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/07/14/us/police-coin-flip-arrest.html; see also Aaron Mak, Georgia Officers
Fired for Using a Coin-Flip App to Decide Whether or Not to Arrest Someone, SLATE: THE
SLATEST (July 27, 2018, 12:24 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/georgia-police-
department-terminates-two-officers-for-consulting-coin-flip-app-during-a-traffic-stop.html.
12. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 40 (1987) (discussing coin tossing for child custody in the case of two unfit
parents); see generally NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-
MAKING 85 (1999).
13. From a litigant’s perspective, this is a difficult argument for several reasons. First, the
text of Rule 606(b) is very broad, employing the word “any” and its variants several times in
reference to evidence about which jurors are prohibited from testifying. Second, the rule’s legisla-
tive history indicates that a narrower rule was considered by Congress and rejected. Third, the
opinion in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 108 (1987) and its progeny seems to preclude
such testimony. But all is not lost. The Supreme Court has been willing, in past cases, to articulate
exceptions to general rules, when applying them would result in an injustice. Cf. Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“In these circumstances, where constitutional rights di-
rectly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.”). In the case of a “full chance verdict” (defined infra
Part I.A), the Court should hear credible evidence that the jury used a chance method in the
interests of justice. Such verdicts defy the most basic tenets of the Constitution, including the
rights to due process and an impartial trier of fact. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. Jurors must
base their conclusions on the evidence at trial. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551
(1976).
14. Indeed, the media frenzy surrounding the officers who flipped a coin is but a taste of the
publicity that might accompany the uncovering of a chance verdict.
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This paper also seeks to further develop the literature surrounding
chance verdicts.15 The existing literature well documents the evolution of
the rules governing juror misconduct as they specifically relate to chance.
Specifically, the extant scholarly work documents the efforts of states to
allow jurors to testify as to chance verdicts,16 the problem of agreeing to be
bound in advance,17 the problem of proof,18 and the origins of the English
common law rule.19 Given that the literature precedes the development of
the internet, it is now possible to reconstruct the cases where a chance ver-
dict actually occurred. This paper seeks to build upon the legal foundation
built by these earlier authors and fit this newly discovered human element
into a legal structure. That is, the episodes discussed by this paper suggest
that chance verdicts will recur; this paper offers a schema for addressing
them.
A. The Four Species of Verdict by Lot
The term “chance verdict” encompasses several species of offensive
jury verdicts. Courts often use terms like “chance verdict,” “verdict by lot,”
or “quotient verdict” interchangeably to refer to different situations where a
jury has committed some form of misconduct involving chance. Distin-
guishing between these different forms of verdict is crucial to understand-
ing how each fits into a larger social schema of juror abdication and judicial
apprehension. This paper will employ the following categories to better as-
sess what each verdict is and what problems it poses:
1. “Full Chance Verdict.” We might define a full chance ver-
dict as a verdict in which the entire jury agrees to decide the
case presented by using some form of chance. In other words,
a “full chance verdict” relates to a binary choice of guilt in
15. See Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 360, 370–72 (1958); A.
V. J. P., Note, Chance and Quotient Verdicts, 37 VA. L. REV. 849 (1951); see also Note, Admissi-
bility of Jurors’ Affidavits to Impeach the Verdict, 44 YALE L.J. 516 (1935); B. M. K., Note,
Jurors—Impeachment of Verdict, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 86 (1915); Henry Wade Rogers, Impeach-
ment of Verdicts for Misconduct, 13 CENT. L.J. 61 (1881), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/
osu.32437010780340; see generally 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial §§ 1539, 1545 (2019); 58 AM. JUR. 2D
New Trial § 249 (2019); 89 C.J.S. Trial § 961 (2019). This paper leaves for another day, and for
other commentators, discussion of the Iowa rule, which historically was a mode by which jurors
could testify as to matters not inhering in the verdict. See Admissibility of Jurors’ Affidavits to
Impeach the Verdict, 44 YALE L.J. 516, 518, n.8 (1935); see also Benjamin T. Huebner, Note,
Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework for Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1469, 1489–90 (2006) (discussing the remaining states where the Iowa rule retains vitality). Hueb-
ner has also assembled an analysis of how states’ rules of evidence resemble the federal rules. Id.
at 1500 (Appendix A) (note that Huebner compares state rules of evidence corresponding to FED.
R. EVID. 606(6), and does not survey other statutes outside of state rules of evidence discussing
chance verdicts).
16. A. V. J. P., supra note 15, at 851 nn.17–19; see also id. at 859 nn.63–68.
17. Id. at 854.
18. Id. at 856.
19. Id. at 856–57.
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the criminal context or liability on the civil side. The form of
chance employed could be flipping a coin to decide the ques-
tion, drawing slips of paper marked “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”
out of a hat, or the like. In these cases, the jury agrees to be
bound by the result of the randomized instrument.20 This is
arguably the most egregious species of chance verdict.
2. “Partial Chance Verdict.” A partial chance verdict occurs
when a smaller portion of the jury employs the tactics de-
scribed above in a full chance verdict. One juror could rest
his or her vote upon the outcome of a coin toss, or several
jurors could do so. In these cases, jurors often comprise the
swing or holdout vote. Thus, the element of chance is in-
jected into the fuller jury’s deliberations, often without the
knowledge of the “innocent” or “law-abiding” jurors.21 In
these cases, the “honest” and “chance” components of the
verdict cannot be disentangled because chance is what
pushed the outcome over the goal line.
3. “Full Quotient Verdict.” A full quotient verdict refers to a
situation in which the entire jury agrees to use an averaging
technique to arrive at a damages figure (civil) or the duration
of imprisonment (criminal). Each juror writes his or her pre-
ferred figure on a slip of paper, and the numbers are aver-
aged. Importantly, to comprise a full quotient verdict, the jury
must agree in advance to be bound by the result of the aver-
aging, without further discussion, after the results are an-
nounced to the group. Thus, a single juror may throw off the
average by inserting a very high or very low figure. For ex-
ample, if the plaintiff in a civil case sought $50,000 in dam-
ages, and a single juror writes down $1,000,000, then that
juror could theoretically manipulate the final damages figure
to be higher than what the plaintiff sought. Conversely, if a
juror is unconvinced that liability should attach, then he or
she could throw off the average by writing $1.00.22
20. An example of an alleged full chance verdict is Beakley v. Optimist Printing Co., 152 P.
212, 213 (Idaho 1915), where two jurors claimed that the whole jury tossed a dollar three times
and agreed that the majority winner of the throws would win the verdict. It is important to note
that counteraffidavits in this case disclaimed any involvement with the tossing of a coin. See id. at
215 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (noting that “the affidavits in this case are ten to two that the verdict
was not arrived at by pitching a dollar”). For another full chance verdict involving drawing names
out of hats, see Mitchell v. Ehle, 10 Wend. 595, 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833); see also Merseve v.
Shine, 37 Iowa 253 (1873) (involving more hats).
21. An example of a partial chance verdict is Dixon v. Pluns, 98 Cal. 384, 385 (1893). An-
other classic example is Schwindt v. Graeff, 142 N.E. 736, 737 (Ohio 1924), where a juror repeat-
edly flipped coins to determine whether to switch sides. See also Reyes v. Seifert, 125 Fed. App’x.
788, 789 (9th Cir. 2005) (holdout flipped a coin during lunch, discussed infra Part III.D).
22. An example of a full quotient verdict is Flood v. McClure, 32 P. 254 (Idaho 1893). An
example of a full quotient verdict where the jurors used extremely disparate figures is Marriner v.
Dennison, 27 P. 927 (Cal. 1891), modified on reh’g, 27 Pac. Rep. 1091. See infra note 236 and
note 239. See generally Pawnee Ditch & Improvement Co. v. Adams, 28 P. 662, 662 (Colo. 1891)
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4. “Working Full Quotient Verdict.” This term refers to a jury
that uses the method described above in subsection 3, but
then uses that average as a platform for further discussion.
The average, then, functions as a tool to show the jury the
general consensus thus far. Most courts consider this sort of
averaging as part and parcel of the negotiations that jurors are
entitled to conduct.23
Distinguishing between these types of chance verdicts are often
glossed over by courts,24 but, crucially, these subtle differences reveal ma-
jor fault lines along which courts attempt to strike a balance between pre-
serving a defendant’s rights and keeping the jury safe from the prying eyes
of clever defense counsel. Hybrids of these four formulations of course
exist.25
(“The proof was not disputed, and it clearly establishes an agreement to be bound by the result to
be thus obtained, which should remain the verdict without further consideration of the issues
which had been submitted.”).
23. An example of a working quotient verdict is Hunt v. Elliott, 20 P. 132, 133 (Cal. 1888).
There, the California Supreme Court noted that the jury’s discussion after the quotient method
was used made the verdict viable because the jury had not agreed to be bound by the blind
quotient process. Id. at 133–34.
24. Many treatises, especially older volumes, do make the distinction. See, e.g., 5 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW 120–36 (2d ed. 1923); 8 THE ENCYCLOPæDIA OF EVIDENCE 977–78 (Edgar Camp
& John Crowe eds., 1906), https://books.google.com/books?id=xYwsAQAAMAAJ&vq=%22
chance%20verdict%22&dq=encyclopedia%20of%20evidence%20volume%208%20crowe%20
camp&pg=PA977#v=onepage&q&f=false; 1 Thomas Carl Spelling, A Treatise on New Trial and
Appellate Practice 241–43, 301–05 (1903); SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & EDWIN G. MERRIAM,
TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES, INCLUDING GRAND JURIES
508–21 (1882); IRA M. MOORE, A TREATISE ON THE CIVIL JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE, AND THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CONSTABLES, IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 533 (1875),
https://books.google.com/books?id=ajE0AQAAMAAJ&pg=PA533&dq=%22flipping+a+copper
%22&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjGrvX5tZfZAhWE7FMKHYPQDYEQ6AEIOjAD#v=one
page&q=%22flipping%20a%20copper%22&f=false. Modern treatises are less reliable on the sub-
ject because they often relate to the practice of law in a single state or support their propositions
with citations to a single case.
25. In Clark v. Foster, 391 P.2d 853, 856 (Idaho 1964), the jurors used a quotient method to
compute which party had been more negligent. The court noted that this method had corrupted the
entire verdict, “not just one cause of action.” Id. at 858. In another example, jurors could not agree
on a damages figure and flipped a coin as between two figures. Crawford v. Consol. Underwriters,
323 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (“The jurors had become deadlocked over whether
the amount was to be $1,250 or $1,450. To resolve the question, they agreed to flip a coin and to
abide the result. A coin was flipped and it favored an award of $1,450.”). The Texas appellate
court reversed. Id. Another unusual example is Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 56 Tenn. 248, 254
(1872), where the jury elected three representatives of each “damages” camp within the jury (one
was for extreme damages, one for medium damages, and the third for minor damages), and agreed
to abide by whatever they came up with. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, saying “[t]hey
surrendered their own judgment and their own will and voice in the settlement of this important
question, and were mere instruments for the registration of the judgments of the three jurors
selected . . . . ” Id. The takeaway here is that juries devise all kinds of methods for advancing
deliberations. Just because a method used by a jury does not perfectly fit into past patterns does
not mean that such verdicts should be free from scrutiny.
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B. Modes in Which Courts Analyze These Verdicts
By that same token, courts adopt different perspectives when examin-
ing the implications of juror misconduct. Categorizing these approaches is
valuable because it enables perception of the changes in discussion of
chance verdicts over time. In general, the four approaches are:
1. “The Public Order Perspective.” Some judges frequently
characterize chance verdicts as dangerous to public order.26
2. “The Rules Perspective.” Some courts view the question of
chance verdicts as a test of whether to bend the no-juror-im-
peachment rule from the perspective of stare decisis.27
3. “The Rights Perspective.” Other decisions imply that a de-
fendant holds a fundamental due process right to a trial in
which jurors fairly consider and debate the case at hand.28
4. “The Practical Perspective.” Some decisions speak of quo-
tient verdicts as part of the inevitable give and take that juries
must conduct.29
26. An example of this phenomenon is Goins v. State, 21 N.E. 476, 482 (Ohio 1889), where
the Ohio Supreme Court opined that verdicts like the hybrid considered “may present a spectacle
so discreditable to our jury system” as to call a universal application of the no-impeachment rule
into doubt.
27. See, e.g., Schwindt v. Graeff, 142 N.E. 736, 737 (Ohio 1924). Justice Robinson opined
for the majority that the no-impeachment rule must stand:
While this cause presents a situation which strains the rule almost to the breaking point,
and demonstrates that every hard and fast rule, whatever its origin, will not further the
ends of justice in all cases, yet, so long as we are to continue to be governed by law,
rather than by men, a rule must be adhered to which is designed to accomplish justice in
the greatest number of cases . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall, dissenting, took a different tack, and challenged the
underlying logic of the rule itself. Id. at 738 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 740 (“Like
Caesar’s wife the administration of justice must be above suspicion. Any rule of long standing
should generally be followed, but when it clearly appears that the rule is wrong there should be no
hesitation in reversing it.”).
28. An example of this approach is Beakley v. Optimist Printing Co., 152 P. 212, 214 (Idaho
1915), a full chance verdict case. There, the Idaho Supreme Court said:
Litigants are not presumed to take chances in submitting their differences to a jury by
the tossing of a dollar or by any other gambling method; and, while such conduct might
be innocent on the part of the jurors, it is nevertheless contrary to law, and should not be
encouraged. Parties to a suit have a right to have their differences carefully and consci-
entiously considered by the jury, and jurors are bound to return verdicts according to the
evidence and the instructions of the court.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. One example is the California Supreme Court’s approach in Mirabito II. See infra note
247. In discussing another quotient verdict, a later court in New York opined:
Realistic reflection forbids indulging in the vagary that the 12 good men and true who
walk into a jury room to evaluate pain and suffering can do so objectively and by appli-
cation of any common norm or reason. We can arrive at no other conclusion but that a
great deal of “arithmeticking” goes on in the jury room in situations of this kind. For
the determination of each member of the jury is susceptible to and influenced by his
own individual experiences relative to pain and suffering and to his own ability to sus-
tain, endure and tolerate it.
Honigsberg v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 249 N.Y.S.2d 296, 303–04 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
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These perspectives often shape the outcomes of chance verdict cases.
Precisely because a chance verdict challenges the integrity of the jury sys-
tem, responses to one often strike at the heart of the author’s beliefs about
jurors and the justice system.
C. Jury Nullification
A critical perspective on chance verdicts is jury nullification.30 In one
sense, a chance verdict is diametrically opposed to the concept of jury nulli-
fication. Jury nullification occurs when a jury acts deliberately to defy or
contravene the law to arrive at a result that the jury considers just. Chance
verdicts occur when a jury refuses to deliberate or abdicates their responsi-
bility to adjudicate. In that sense, a chance verdict cannot simultaneously
constitute jury nullification because the jury is leaving the realm of engag-
ing with the law and the facts of the case completely.
But in another sense, we might understand some chance verdicts as a
sub-species of jury nullification. This is because in some forms of chance
verdicts, the jury believes that the choice they are presented with is too
charged to render a decision. As community members, they are unwilling to
act to punish someone for an illegal act. Rather than explicitly nullify the
proceedings, they resort to a chance method either to decide the case or
compute damages. This reduces the level of individual juror responsibility
for the result of the whole. In this manner, an unwilling juror can relieve
discomfort with the proceeding (either the substance of the case or the bur-
den of working with other, more stubborn jurors) by leaving the decision up
to a method that in the moment seems fair.31 Thus, the juror nullifies the
proceedings by washing his or her hands of the appointed task.
Juries are an attractive tool for dispute resolution because they are both
“secret and definitive.”32 The jury verdict is the ultimate exercise in discre-
tion based on facts. But the notion of the jury has taken on significance as a
particularly American symbol of democratic justice, and some commenta-
tors view jury nullification as an extension of that duty to administer jus-
tice.33 Others subscribe to the notion that a jury is beyond such crude
instruments as compromise. “[T]he paramount and sworn duty of jurors is
30. See generally CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE
(1998).
31. Most accounts of chance verdicts—as discussed infra Part II—reflect that they occur in
pressured situations.
32. Daniel Givelber, Kalven and Zeisel in the Twenty-First Century: Is the Jury Still the
Defendant’s Friend?, in WHEN LAW FAILS 140, 142 (Charles J. Ogeltree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
2009).
33. See generally Null and Void, RADIO LAB (May 12, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/
podcasts/radiolab/articles/null-and-void.
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to serve the truth as a higher goal than even consensus or agreement.”34
When juries take an oath, they commit themselves to serving something
greater than themselves.35 Juror oaths often speak of the requirement that
juries render a “true” verdict.36 In that sense, then, a verdict where chance is
involved represents the civic equivalent of an uninvited guest, whereas jury
nullification is—depending on the observer—the logical extension of, or
abdication of, the oath.37 But for verdicts using chance methods, it is clear
that they undermine the proceeding and call into question the very notion of
community justice; with jury nullification, the issue is disputed. For this
reason, chance verdicts have particular significance for jurists and policy-
makers because of the threat they pose to the integrity of the system itself.
D. Ideal Jurors
The problem with uncovering a chance verdict is that airing juror mis-
conduct could destroy the jury system. Chance verdicts are so captivating
and divisive because they capture people’s insecurities about community-
based judgment. Can we trust juries? Can we trust each other? Justice
O’Connor in Tanner answered, in the main, that if we lift the curtain ob-
scuring the jury’s deliberations, what we see will drain trust from the sys-
tem.38 But Judge Reinhardt in dissent in Reyes (discussed infra Part III.D)
answered that policing misconduct can maintain that trust.39 When must the
legal system shield a jury—no matter its crime?
Courts answering these questions in the context of a chance verdict
must simultaneously contend with different apprehensions. First, many
courts invoke the unwelcome prospect of a cascade of intrepid defense law-
yers who would surely exploit any relaxation of the no-impeachment rule to
benefit presumably guilty clients. Second, especially in older cases, there is
an undercurrent of fear that extrajudicial power might be brought to bear on
a case incensing the community. For these judges, the jury was functioning
34. Jeffrey Abramson, Jury Deliberation: Far and Foul, in JURY ETHICS 186, 186 (John
Kleinig et al. eds., 2006). Abramson argues that political compromise is the stuff of legislative
deliberation rather than jury deliberation.
35. See CONRAD, supra note 30, at 240 (discussing the juror oath in different states and
different examples of jurors breaking oaths).
36. See id.
37. DUXBURY, supra note 12, at 46 (“In fiction, the lottery frequently represents tyranny: to
decide randomly is very often to engage in capricious, unnerving, malevolent behavior.”); see also
id. at 20 (discussing chance verdicts). Courts have also picked up on this problem of oath break-
ing. See Goodman v. Cody, 1 Wash. Terr. 329, 331–32 (Wash. 1871) (“The same defects exactly
occur in a verdict got by average of sums furnished by individual jurors. In neither case is the
verdict made valid by the oath of the jury, since in both cases it is got in a manner incompatible
with submission to their oath.”).
38. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987) (“It is not at all clear, however, that
the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”).
39. Reyes v. Seifert, 125 F. App’x 788, 789 (9th Cir. 2005) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Reyes
is typical of the divide that courts often encounter in managing these problems.
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not as an instrument of justice, but as an instrument of anarchy, or—per-
haps worse—of mob violence. Third, there is a fear of letting a verdict
stand that undermines the judicial system by disrobing its unfairness. There
is a tension in chance verdict cases between an “ideal” jury (sober, disinter-
ested, attentive, and fair)40 and the “scalawag” jury (predisposed,
prejudiced, lazy, and arbitrary).41 Judges are palpably afraid of a jury prede-
termining an outcome or agreeing to be bound to a damages figure that one
juror could throw off with a high average. The simple reality is, and always
has been, that juries bring a great deal of predisposition and prejudice into
their deliberations. The question is what to do about it when reliable evi-
dence of misconduct surfaces.
Given the import of these questions, chance verdicts are a useful lens
in assessing a community’s perspective on the jury’s power. Jurists
throughout American history have come to different conclusions on these
problems. As we delve into the history of chance verdicts, it is important to
remember that we might conceptualize “chance” as the unstable element
that has been improperly introduced into the sanctity of the jury room. But
this is an illusion, and one that judges frequently invoke. The truth is that
chance is not the unstable element when a jury contemplates using chance
methods—it is the community itself that is unstable.
II. CHANCE VERDICT VIGNETTES
Four vignettes in the history of chance verdicts illustrate how and why
these troubled verdicts tend to crop up in court reporters every ten or so
years. Far from the outlandish and isolated incidents portrayed in the deci-
sions, these individual stories demonstrate that when conditions are ripe,
some juries will turn to chance methods to resolve some or all of their
differences. In extreme cases, this means deciding the whole case with a
flip of a coin. It could also mean drawing names out of a hat to decide
between two alternatives or using a quotient method to satisfy different
stubborn elements of the jury. These are not freak occurrences. As long as
jurors are deciding cases, these vignettes suggest that chance verdicts will
occur sporadically. They also suggest that chance verdicts have been poorly
understood as an outlier in the American justice system rather than as an
integral—if infrequently proven—component of the history of juries. Each
story, to some degree, fits a schema.
A. Crafting a Schema for Assessing Historical Episodes
First, each verdict occurred amidst some sort of upheaval within the
community. The upheaval could relate to the facts of the particular case, or
40. See, e.g., United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019).
41. See, e.g., Pen˜a-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); Smith v. Cheetham, 3
Cai. 57, 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J.).
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the case itself could relate to larger changes that the community was exper-
iencing. These upheavals put pressure on these juries to use chance methods
to either shy away from their role as deciders—or, in the alternative, to
express their disapproval at the process.42 In the Dickson case, the upheaval
was the massive changes in tort liability at the beginning of the twentieth
century, as courts wrestled with how to deal with new liabilities like street-
cars. That upheaval related directly to the facts of the case, producing a
sympathetic plaintiff that inflamed the jury’s passions and brought them to
a deadlock. In the Tharp case, the trial took place in the context of a cam-
paign in Arkansas to restore the image of the state’s justice system as met-
ing out punishments without the interference of local mobs.
Simultaneously, Tharp itself was a case of extrajudicial violence; the com-
munity sought to protect one of its own who had “acted like a man.” The
Perkey and Goins cases, meanwhile, were part and parcel of a struggle in
which racial tensions boiled over in local communities. The bar fight in
Perkey and the election riot in Goins were each racially motivated events,
and there was pressure on the jury to act a certain way.
Second, these cases are important because their facts were fairly clear.
In other words, there was little doubt in each case of what had happened.
The trials occurred in communities already convinced of what had tran-
spired, and the only question to be resolved was what the community
wanted to do about the violence. Because that question was a charged one,
these juries acted rashly under pressure. The Dickson jury punted and
flipped a coin to decide the case, the Tharp and Perkey juries used quotient
methods, and the Goins jury drew lots as between two different measures of
guilt. In each case, it is self-evident that these methods were used because
the jury could not agree on a just outcome, even if they agreed on what had
happened.
Third, in each case, the media played an outsized role in publicizing
and scandalizing the result. Indeed, the only reason that records of some of
these cases survive is because the newspapers at the time felt that the cases
were newsworthy. It might be more accurately said that the newspapers felt
the story would generate profits and promote sales. Either way, the papers
followed these cases closely and contributed to public outrage when a result
based on chance occurred. In some instances, the papers even misstated the
kind of chance method used by the jury to make the story sound more
salacious.
This schema shows that chance verdicts do not occur in a vacuum.
They occur amidst social strife or when the jury is under pressure. In other
words, the schema demonstrates that these kinds of verdicts are likely to
42. It is also important to concede here that some jurors simply use chance methods out of
pure apathy. While examining these vignettes through the lens of sloth may help explain these
outcomes, it does nothing to aid us in using these events to gain insight into the jury system.
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recur at least once in a generation.43 They are rare, but they reappear. This
makes understanding them and planning for them all the more important for
legislators and jurists.
B. “It is Too Bad Mr. Casey Did Not Live to Qualify Again as a
Juror”: Dickson and The Grief of Mr. Casey
Chance verdicts appear in records of New York courts since the earli-
est days of our republic. In 1805, the Supreme Court of New York consid-
ered a full quotient verdict case; Chief Justice Kent and Justice Livingston
delivered opinions on the relationship between chance verdicts and quotient
averaging.44 In another quotient verdict case, the court noted that as long as
the jurors did not bind themselves to the quotient result, the proceeding was
proper.45 In 1833, the jurors in a slander case put ballots marked “prize” in
a hat with blank ballots, and agreed that more “prize” ballots drawn would
mean a verdict for the plaintiffs; the state supreme court struck down the
verdict in a two sentence order.46 Chance verdicts were already well-docu-
43. Or, it might be said that a provable chance verdict will come to light only now and then.
44. Justice Kent’s opinion is remarkable because it clearly identifies the problems courts
hundreds of years later would encounter with chance verdicts: (a) whether chance and quotient
verdicts were similarly problematic; (b) the dilemma of allowing jurors to testify as to their own
conduct in the face of a rule as strong and old as the no-impeachment rule; and (c) the interloper
problem, where a quotient verdict is corrupted by one juror using an unreasonably high figure. He
wrote:
If the jury cast lots for whom they shall find, it would no doubt vitiate the verdict
. . . .The charge here, is not that the jury cast lots whether they should find for the
plaintiff or defendant, but only that in ascertaining the amount of the damages, they took
the average sum deduced from the different opinions of each other. This has no analogy
to the case of casting lots, or determining by chance, for whom they shall find. The
liquidation of damages must always, in a certain degree, be the result of mutual conces-
sion, since the amount of the injury is not susceptible of being ascertained with mathe-
matical precision.
Cheetham, 3 Cai. at 60 (Kent, C.J.) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Living-
ston took a different tack:
Every verdict should be the result of reflection, and not the effect of chance or lot.
Jurors being sworn to determine according ‘to evidence,’ suitors have a right to expect
that they will examine and decide upon it to the best of their ability and discernment.
But if lot is to be substituted for judgment, if deliberation and reflection are to yield to
the cast of a die, parties instead of exposing themselves to a heavy and useless expense,
will gamble away their rights, or have recourse to more intemperate means of ascertain-
ing them. The practice, therefore, cannot be too promptly nor strongly discountenanced
. . . . Indeed, not many centuries back, our superstitious ancestors considered this equiv-
ocal mode of ending a controversy as a direct and legitimate appeal to heaven, and as a
certain way of discovering the divine will. Here, the method of deciding as effectually
precluded a proper exercise of judgment, as that of chance; and, what is worse, put it in
the power of any one juror, from prejudice, passion, or other bad motive, to ruin a
defendant. He is only to set down a sum sufficiently large, and, if his fellows adhere to
their promise, a most outrageous verdict will be the consequence. Thus no one can tell,
at the time of pledging himself, what sum he will finally agree to.
Id. (Livingston, J.) (emphasis added).
45. Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487, 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
46. Mitchell v. Ehle, 10 Wend. 595, 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (“The verdict was manifestly
the result of the lottery, and not of the deliberations of the jury. It must be set aside; costs to abide
the event.”).
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mented phenomena in New York by the time that an Irish immigrant named
John Casey was empaneled on a Manhattan jury in 1908.
The case was a sad one. A young girl of four, Lily Dickson, was cross-
ing Columbus Avenue with her mother on June 25, 1905 and ran into an
oncoming streetcar.47 The girl’s father, Thomas Dickson, sued the New
York City Railway Company for damages; the jury returned a verdict for
the defendant company.48 Dickson was represented by Louis Steckler, a
well-known trial lawyer and foe of Tammany Hall.49 Upon being asked
how the jury arrived at such a verdict, the foreman, Timothy S. Yale, ironi-
cally an accountant, admitted that the jury had flipped a coin.50 Stunned, the
judge, Justice Guy,51 fined each juror $50, about $1,300 in 2018 dollars.52
The basic story of the Dickson case is remarkable. First, the jury as a
whole confessed to having used the chance method:
When Foreman Timothy S. Yale announced the verdict, Justice
Guy was plainly amazed at it.
‘However did you arrive at such a verdict?’ he asked.
‘By the flip of a coin,’ answered Foreman Yale.
When Justice Guy had recovered from his surprise he learned
from the foreman that it was an understanding between the jurors
that if the coin came down heads they would give the verdict to
the plaintiff. If it turned up tails, then the defendant was to win.
Each of them when questioned jurymen acknowledged this ver-
sion to be correct . . . .
One of the jurors, in speaking of what happened in the jury room,
said they were so hopelessly divided that it was decided to flip the
coin, especially as one of their number had $6,000 in his pocket,
with which he was going to close a deal, and wanted to get away
quickly.53
47. Spin Coin to Get Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1908, at 3, http://www.newspapers.com/
image/20580289. It is important to note that this headline in The New York Times appeared along-
side other vice-related headlines. Another article on the same page was titled “Era of Conscience
Advances Morals – Uprising Against Gambling” and “Demands Law to Stop Racetrack Gam-
bling.” Id.
48. Id.
49. See $50 Fines Shocked a Jury, EVENING POST (New York) Feb. 25, 1908, at 1, http://nys
historicnewspapers.org/lccn/sn83030384/1908-02-25/ed-1/seq-1.pdf (referencing Steckler); see
also Senior Member of Law Firm, Foe of Tammany Hall, Dies at 76, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1941, at
17, https://nyti.ms/2v2eqIM.
50. Id. Unfortunately, the case file has been lost. Thus, the only record of this case that exists
is the highly sensationalized and questionably accurate newspaper record. The account, however,
is highly detailed, lending credence to the tale.
51. Id. Justice Guy had served previously as a State Senator on the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary and Codes. See H. C. GAUSS, WHO’S WHO IN NEW YORK CITY AND STATE 592–93
(John W. Leonard ed., 4th ed. 1909).
52. THE INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://westegg.com/inflation (input “50” in the “enter
amount” category, “1908” in the “initial year” category, and “2018” in the “final year” category).
53. Spin Coin to Get Verdict, supra note 47.
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Given the ensuing media firestorm, it is difficult to believe that the jury
simply confessed in open court together to using this method. The newspa-
per account, however, seems to imply that each juror was questioned indi-
vidually. It is possible that the judge questioned the foreman privately and
proceeded to each juror in turn. It is also possible that the jury was simply
unaware of the taboo it had broken. The jury, as it was, consisted of an
accountant, an insurance broker, a second broker, a “dealer in meats,” a
grocer, a man of “real estate,” an ironworker (Casey), a publisher, a liquor
salesman, a watchman, an agent, and a baker.54 It is also possible that in the
heat of the moment, when two sides in the jury room were deadlocked, a
coin flip may have seemed the fairest way to resolve the case. It is also
important to note that this case presents the rare full chance verdict with no
quotient component.
A second phenomenon is that The New York Times was not afraid to
name names. The paper published the jury register in full and even gave
each juror’s address. The public shaming could not have been more humili-
ating, as the article appeared alongside other missives against vice and gam-
bling. Further, the paper framed the story as that of justice gambled away
from a grieving father. The paper also reprinted Justice Guy’s admonition
word for word:
You have arrived at your verdict by a most improper method, by
one contrary to law, in contempt of this court, and in direct viola-
tion of your oaths as jurors. I cannot adequately express my indig-
nation at such conduct on the part of jurors in so serious an issue.
I therefore impose a fine of $50 upon each of you for contempt of
court.55
The fine was compounded by the fact that the jurors were forced to return
for jury duty each day until the end of the term, though they would not be
serving on any panels.
As chance verdicts go, Dickson is classic. It took place with a sympa-
thetic plaintiff and a deadlocked jury. If the newspapers’ account is to be
believed, one juror wanted to leave to close his $6,000 deal. The case oc-
curred in the height of the new era of tort when streetcars were new to New
York City. The judge certainly thought the case was an easy one. It is not
surprising then that the newspaper painted the jurors as corrupting the pub-
lic sphere. Other newspapers jumped to print a story so sensational. The
Brooklyn Eagle printed a narrative similar to The New York Times but clari-
fied that the chance verdict had been revealed when the judge spoke to the
54. Id.
55. Id.
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foreman.56 The Evening Post poked fun at the jurymen, calling them the
“mulcted dozen,”57 writing:
Justice Guy levied the tax upon the talesmen [term for jurymen]
after one of the most severe impromptu scoldings that twelve men
have ever received in a public court room. It all happened because
they had settled a case for damages, on account of the killing of a
little girl, by the sporting expedient of ‘flipping up a coin.’
Frankly each man admitted that he had agreed to decide the dis-
pute in this manner. Equally frankly and promptly the twelve men
were declared in contempt of court.58
Over the next few weeks, the story spread to papers as far away as Spokane,
Washington,59 Bennington, Vermont,60 Caldwell, Kansas,61 Pine Bluff, Ar-
kansas,62 Johnson City, Tennessee,63 and Wilmington, Delaware.64 Local
56. Tossed Coin for a Verdict, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Feb. 25, 1908, at 1, http://www
.newspapers.com/image/53877461.
57. $50 Fines Shocked a Jury, EVENING POST (New York), Feb. 25, 1908, at 1, http://nyshis
toricnewspapers.org/lccn/sn83030384/1908-02-25/ed-1/seq-1.pdf. The term “mulcted” converted
the jurymen into the criminals; “mulct” refers to one fined for a misdemeanor. See Mulct, DIC-
TIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/mulct. This vice language reflects another com-
mon aspect of chance verdicts; the jurors become the accused. The abdication of jury duty is a
civic taboo on a whole different plane than simply evading service.
58. $50 Fines Shocked a Jury, supra note 57. The Evening Post’s account added several
details but is substantially the same as The New York Times’.
59. See No Gambler Verdicts Go, SPOKANE PRESS, Feb. 26, 1908, at 1, http://www.newspa
pers.com/image/194732355.
60. Jury Flipped a Coin, BENNINGTON BANNER (Bennington, Vermont), Feb. 27, 1908, at 1,
http://www.newspapers.com/image/174750353.
61. City News, CALDWELL NEWS (Caldwell, Kansas), Feb. 28, 1908, at 5, http://www.news
papers.com/image/164160846. The paper included the note alongside other brief, amusing tidbits
of news and non-news, and wrote of the incident: “A New York jury recently flipped a copper in
order to arrive at a verdict aside and fined each juror $50 each [sic]. That judge seems to have
some notion about the dignity of the law.” Id. The dignity language echoes the vice language; the
abdication is an embarrassment.
62. Which Is Worse?, PINE BLUFF DAILY GRAPHIC (Pine Bluff, Arkansas), Mar. 7, 1908, at 4,
http://www.newspapers.com/image/274488313. The paper characterized the incident in political
terms, stating:
[The judicial reprimand] was all done solemnly, as befitted the importance of an occa-
sion designed to emphasize the majesty of the law, which had been manifestly outraged,
or at least brought into disrepute, through this flippancy, so to speak, of the twelve good
men and true. . . . It will puzzle these same thoughtful people to say which is more
reprehensible, the tossing of a coin to decide grave questions of public service or the
tossing of a coin to decide a jury’s verdict.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. Some Chance Verdicts, COMET (Johnson City, Tennessee), Mar. 19, 1908, at 3, http://
www.newspapers.com/image/174260539.
64. Coin Flipped; Jurors Fined, MORNING NEWS (Wilmington, Delaware), Feb. 26, 1908, at
4, http://www.newspapers.com/image/160104300. The Morning News inserted into its narrative a
dry note that President Roosevelt had recently flipped a coin to fill several federal posts in North
Dakota. Id.
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newspapers continued to print the story.65 As The Comet noted, a retrial in
March 1908 led to a jury verdict of $1,250 in favor of the plaintiff.66
The story might have ended there, as a mere curiosity, but what hap-
pened next shows the stigma with which chance verdicts were regarded in
the public sphere. In late March of 1908, the newspapers again exploded
with a shocking new twist: one of the jurors, John W. Casey, an ironworker,
“died of grief” because he could not bear the shame of the chance verdict.67
One newspaper reported that Casey had been excited to serve on a jury for
the first time, but that, after being reprimanded by Justice Guy, he told his
family, “My heart is breaking. Soon, if I cannot forget, I shall die.”68 The
New York Times felt the story so significant (or sensational) that it printed
Casey’s obituary on the front page.69 The New York Times reported that
Casey was distraught at the castigation he received from Justice Guy.70 “I
know I was ignorant . . . and they told me that cases were often settled that
way. But I know better now,” the newspaper reported Casey saying.71 The
newspaper’s depiction of Casey’s descent into despondency is almost comi-
cal.72 The newspaper painted the shame of the chance verdict as some kind
of haunting visited upon Casey. As an immigrant,73 the abdication of his
civic duty was all the more sensational. This portrayal of civic distress
bleeding into actual affliction demonstrates the potency of the taboo Casey
broke. It was a crime so severe that the sheer shame of having committed it
would kill the wrongdoer.
Different periodicals drew different lessons from Casey’s story on be-
half of their readers. For the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader in Pennsylvania,
65. Flip Coin for Verdict, N.Y. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1908, at 9, http://www.newspapers.com/im
age/88188732.
66. Some Chance Verdicts, COMET (Johnson City, Tennessee), Mar. 19, 1908, at 3, http://
www.newspapers.com/image/174260539.
67. Juror Dies of Grief, BUFFALO ENQUIRER, Mar. 31, 1908, at 10, http://www.newspapers
.com/image/325495269 (“Casey actually died of grief because of the scathing censure of the jury
by Justice Guy before whom the damage suit was brought in the Supreme Court. His family
believed that he died of a broken heart, firmly convinced that he had been disgraced forever.”).
68. Juror Dies From Grief, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 31, 1908, at 1, http://www
.newspapers.com/image/85914189.
69. Grieved to Death Over Court Rebuke, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1908, at 1, https://www
.newspapers.com/image/20365384. The New York Times was not the only paper to print Casey’s
obituary on its front page. See Juror Dies From Grief, INDEPENDENCE DAILY REP. (Independence,
Kansas), Apr. 2, 1908, at 1, https://newspapers.com/image/93939940.
70. Grieved to Death Over Court Rebuke, supra note 69.
71. Id.
72. The newspaper wrote:
He neglected his business and spent his days wandering aimlessly around the house, his
nights in a continually unsuccessful struggle to sleep. He could not forget what he him-
self termed his disgrace, and a week ago he took to his bed. From a very heavy man of
296 pounds, he wasted in a month to 200 pounds.
Id.
73. See Coin Flipped; Verdict Given; A Juror Dies, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (St. Louis,
Missouri), Mar. 31, 1908, at 20, http://www.newspapers.com/image/138903474.
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the incident was an opportunity to reflect on the constitution of the ideal
citizen:
The pathos of the incident has a certain quaintness of its own –
Mr. Casey took his rebuke more seriously than the average man
would, too seriously indeed, and yet disclosed a sensitiveness IN
WHICH WAS MATERIAL FOR THE FINEST SORT OF CITI-
ZENSHIP [sic]. If on the public men open to accusation for negli-
gence and favoritism, the numerous brood of officials impeached,
presented, indicted, and who sometimes blush, the whole world of
officialdom showed half the sensitiveness poor Casey did, it
would be better for city, county and State. It is too bad Mr. Casey
did not live to qualify again as a juror – he would have made a
good one – but even in death he teaches a lesson worth
teaching.74
In other words, the “wrongness” of the incident could have endowed Casey
with precisely the demeanor desired of jurors—careful contemplation and
sensitivity. By his misconduct, the paper reasoned, Casey could have be-
come an even more “valuable” citizen; his judgment in a hypothetical later
case would have drawn wisdom from the experience.
Seeming to back off of its earlier obituary, The New York Times took a
different tack, and in a later article cerebrally considered the merging of
cause and effect in the evaluations of Casey’s death, noting that people saw
Casey’s death as they wanted to: as a signifier for civic decay taking a toll
on physical health.75 Far from a man who had abdicated his duties, this
portrait of Casey transitions into someone who, quite ironically, was simply
the victim of bad luck in drawing such comrades amongst the wider jury
pool. The article perceptively noted that observers ascribed to Casey a rav-
aging and unshakeable disease of mental guilt that precipitated (rather than
coincided with) his physical decline. People saw what they wanted to see—
the notion of a chance verdict was so aberrant that when Casey expired, the
connection between his public shaming and his death was not just obvious:
it was instructive. Casey’s official death record held by the state of New
York lists the causes of death as pneumonia and chronic nephritis.76 Later
that spring, the Dickson family won $1,250 in a second jury trial, and the
papers went back to lumping the news in with fanciful musings on coin
flips in literature and days of yore.77
74. Supersensitive, WILKES-BARRE TIMES LEADER, EVENING NEWS (Wilkes-Barre, Penn-
sylvania), Apr. 2, 1908, at 6, https://www.newspapers.com (search “supersensitive” in search bar
and add additional information: “Pennsylvania” as location and “1908” and date range; then click
on the fifth search result).
75. Cause and Effect Transposed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1908, at 6, https://www.newspapers
.com/image/20415715/?terms%22cause+and+effect+transposed%22.
76. Certificate and Record of Death of John W. Casey (1908) (on file with author).
77. Chance in Reaching Verdicts, OMAHA DAILY BEE (Omaha, Nebraska), May 3, 1908, at
20, http://www.newspapers.com/image/226618105; see also Change Verdicts, MUNCIE EVENING
PRESS (Muncie, Indiana), May 6, 1908, at 4, http://www.newspapers.com/image/249548649.
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The Dickson case fits the trend of chance verdicts: a case with a sym-
pathetic party (be it a plaintiff with a tragic story, or a defendant considered
innocent by the community) goes to a jury, and at least some of the jury,
feeling overwhelmed, abdicate their duties and resort to a chance verdict.
We may also observe the media firestorm around the case as evidence of
the position that chance verdicts occupy in the American consciousness:
they lay bare, more than any legal argument ever could, the failures of the
justice system.
C. “The Professional Traducers of the South Will Not Obtain Much
Comfort from the Verdict of this Jury”: Murder in the Ozarks
The next chapter in the history of verdict by lot brings us to Arkansas
in the early 1890s. As has been well documented, Arkansas society during
this period was rife with extrajudicial violence, particularly directed against
African Americans.78 As the Democratic party reassumed power in a post-
Reconstruction world, school board elections became a focal point for polit-
ical violence.79 The murder of Thomas Mason in 1893 took place against a
backdrop of violence in a culture of white supremacy that was reasserting
itself.80 As far as chance verdicts were concerned, Arkansas law contained a
similar statutory exception to California (discussed infra Part III.A) al-
lowing jurors to testify as to verdicts by lot.81
The facts of Thomas Mason’s murder are difficult to pinpoint pre-
cisely, given how sensationalized the account in the media was. It may well
78. See GUY LANCASTER, RACIAL CLEANSING IN ARKANSAS, 1883–1924: POLITICS, LAND,
LABOR, AND CRIMINALITY 5 (2014) (discussing the economic changes that prompted violence
against African Americans); see also LAURA EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE 74 (2009)
(discussing the blurry line between vigilante and justice-system-sanctioned conduct in the post-
Revolutionary South).
79. LANCASTER, supra note 78, at 35–36; see also William Fishback, Reconstruction in Ar-
kansas, in HILARY A. HERBERT ET AL., WHY THE SOLID SOUTH? OR, RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS
RESULTS 294, 313 (1890) (“If this review were not already too long, I could show that the various
county and school debts were equally fraudulent. In many of the counties script was forged and
then bonded.”).
80. As discussed infra Part III, Arkansas politicians and notables were terribly concerned
with the presentation of their state in the national press. One paper in 1895 printed the account of a
Baltimore man who explored Arkansas and heaped praises on the state’s wonderous climes. See
William H. Edmonds, Truth About Arkansas, MONTICELLONIAN (Monticello, Arkansas), Feb. 22,
1895, at 1, https://newspapers.com/image/288001182 (“No state in the Union has greater or more
varied resources, industrial and agricultural, in climate and health than Arkansas, and nowhere
else is there a higher degree of refinement.”). Even buried in this sycophantic account is the
murmur of the state’s treatment at the hands of less kind periodicals. Id. (“In spite of all that the
state has suffered at the hands of traducers and thoughtless writers, it is undergoing a wonderful
development.”) (emphasis added). The word “traduce” will become relevant infra Part II.C.
81. See Wilder v. State, 29 Ark. 293, 298 (1874); see also Fain v. Goodwin, 35 Ark. 109, 113
(1879) (referencing the same statute). For a later analysis, see Blaylack v. State, 370 S.W.2d 615,
616 (Ark. 1963), and Martin v. Blackmon, 640 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Ark. 1983) (noting statutory
history of the exception).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 21  2-APR-20 11:58
2020] JUSTICE BY LOT: THE TABOO OF CHANCE VERDICTS 229
be that readers were aware of more going on beneath the surface.82 In the
small town of Pleasant Plains in the spring of 1893, a school board election
was held.83 During the election, a divorced man84 named Thomas Mason
slandered the wife of a man named H.L. Tharp. The paper hinted at the
character of the statements without explicitly mentioning sexual conduct,
noting that they “reflected very much on his (Tharp’s) wife as a virtuous
lady.”85 Tharp confronted Mason, and demanded “a retraction.”86 When
Mason refused, Tharp “walked away a few paces, then suddenly turned,
walked up to Mason and fired two bullets into his body. Mason dropped
dead.”87 The Daily Arkansas Gazette went on to note that “Tharp is a high-
toned gentleman and his wife is an estimable lady, against whose reputation
as a wife and lady the breath of scandal HAS NEVER BLOWN until the present
unfortunate occasion.”88
The Daily Arkansas Gazette’s account suggests several conclusions.
First, there was no doubt as to the facts of the murder. Indeed, the language
suggests that the almost-Shakespearean characters were well-known to the
community. Second, the perpetrator is immediately absolved by the periodi-
cal of any blame; indeed, every mention of Mason is couched in terms of
blame for bringing death upon himself. Other newspapers took a similar
tack.89 He is no victim—he is a divorced slanderer who got what was com-
ing to him. The local community rallied quickly around Tharp.90 The news-
82. In the southern legal tradition, proceedings in the earlier part of the century were charac-
terized as a creature of local imperatives, traditions, and actors. See EDWARDS, supra note 78, at
65 (“Often, the deciding factors were so obvious to the participants that they never made their way
into the court records: they were the elephant in the room that everyone saw but no one
acknowledged.”).
83. Thomas Mason’s Mouth, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock, Arkansas), May 23, 1893,
at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/132647788.
84. See id. The paper was quick to insert this particularly damning piece of information about
the victim.
85. Id.
86. Id. The journalistic jargon made the story all the more colorful.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis in original).
89. The Mountain Educator characterized the incident in two sentences that the editors ap-
parently felt explained the situation perfectly. See MOUNTAIN EDUCATOR (Marshall, Arkansas),
June 1, 1893, at 8, http://www.newspapers.com/image/284301263 (“Prof. H.L. Tharp shot and
killed Thomas Mason near Pleasant Plains, Independence Co., on the 22ult [sic]. The trouble was
over some talk Mason used about Tharp’s family.”). The St. Joseph Weekly Gazette described the
murder as a “fearful tragedy” and stated that Mason “made some damaging remarks about his
[Tharp’s] wife, which, if true, would seriously compromise her reputation.” Killed for Slandering
a Woman, ST. JOSEPH WKLY. GAZETTE (St. Joseph, Missouri), June 1, 1893, at 7, http://www
.newspapers.com/image/246196352.
90. See An Arkansas Tragedy, MOUNTAIN ECHO (Yellville, Arkansas), June 9, 1893, at 2,
http://www.newspapers.com/image/174628762 (“The sympathy of the entire town is with Prof.
Tharp and his wife, who is regarded by all who know her as a true and faithful wife.”). The
Southern tradition of localized justice as a “literal rendering of popular sovereignty” has been
well-documented. See EDWARDS, supra note 78, at 65; see also id. at 79 (“[S]outherners ignored
or challenged those verdicts with which they did not agree precisely because they had enough
confidence in the idea of law to believe that it could be engaged and changed.”).
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papers themselves clue us into the mindset: slander of a married woman’s
sexuality was a taboo for which severe consequences would attach to the
traducer.
Importantly, at least one segment of the local community thought that
the law deserved satisfaction. As the State began to prosecute its case
against Tharp in May of 1893, Judge Butler set bail at $3,000.91 Tharp was
indicted by a grand jury for first degree murder, which was carried out
“with premeditation and deliberation.”92 In his bail application, Tharp’s at-
torneys stated that “[Tharp] does not believe that he is guilty as charged in
the indictment.”93 At trial, it seems that Tharp tried to claim insanity pro-
voked by Mason’s slander of his wife.94 This claim—that Tharp was so
disturbed by the attack on his wife that he did not know right from wrong—
is important because it conveys the level of seriousness with which the
community viewed an allegation of sexual impropriety. Mason violated a
norm of the community by insulting Tharp’s honor. The court record also
contains the testimony of a witness, Junius Saddler, the deputy sheriff of
Pleasant Plains, although the testimony is undated.95 Saddler testified that
he was with Tharp when Tharp confronted Mason. Allegedly, Mason said,
he saw Saddler and Mrs. Tharp at the post office looking “too friendly.”96
Mason refused to recant his story and told Tharp in the presence of several
witnesses that “I would be suspicious of her.”97 Tharp threatened to take
down Mason’s words as testimony,98 yelled something to the effect of “My
God, how can I stand that,” and then shot Mason as Saddler tried to inter-
91. The court records of the Tharp matter were sent to the author by the Circuit Clerk of
Batesville, Arkansas. The records of the 1893 and 1895 trials seem to have been consolidated. The
file is not paginated; where a document contained a date, the author has included it, and will cite
to the record as [Document-Type] [at pincite], State of Arkansas v. H.L. Tharp, [date]. The docu-
ment where Judge Butler set bail is dated May 21, 1893.
92. Indictment at 1, State of Arkansas v. H.L. Tharp, Sept. 1893.
93. Application for Bail, State of Arkansas v. H.L. Tharp, Oct. 7, 1893.
94. Jury Instructions, State of Arkansas v. H.L. Tharp.  The jury instructions are difficult to
assess, because the file contains several documents that clearly are jury instructions, but it is not
clear whether these instructions were submitted by the State or Tharp’s attorneys, or were read by
the judge to the jury. Some of the instructions contain a notation on the left side of the page that
may read “Given,” but the word is not perfectly legible. One of these documents reads:
The jury are instructed that if they believe from the evidence in the case that some time
in 1888 the mind of the defendant was so affected as to dethrone his reason and destroy
his will power and that by reason thereof his mind would be more easily influenced and
excited his reason be more easily dethroned and his will power more easily destroyed or
over come [sic] and if they further believe from the evidence that at the time of the
killing the mind of the defendant was so excited or over-come as to dethrone his reason
[illegible] . . . to the extent that he did not know right from wrong or destroy his will
power or that at the time of the killing he was incapable of controlling his action then he
would not be guilty[.]
Id.
95. Testimony of Junius Saddler, State of Arkansas v. H.L. Tharp.
96. Id. at 4.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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vene.99 The testimony is fascinating because it shows clearly that Tharp
murdered Mason in the presence of multiple witnesses.
According to Tharp’s motion for new trial, the jury rendered a verdict
of sixty-two days in prison after agreeing to use a quotient method.100 In the
motion, Tharp’s attorneys characterized the quotient verdict as a chance
verdict, claiming that the verdict “was decided by lot and was not expres-
sive of the opinion of the jury” and that the jury had agreed to abide in
advance by the quotient.101 The Motion for New Trial also alleged that
Tharp had been prevented from showing that Mason was a member of “the
Populite [sic] political organization[.]”102 Later, Tharp alleged that because
the jury had settled on convicting the defendant of involuntary manslaugh-
ter, the State could not recharge Tharp with any offense above that grade.103
After Tharp’s conviction, prominent citizens of Batesville rallied
around him. The Daily Arkansas Gazette reported in October of 1893 that
two men, George W. McCauley104 and Frank Denton,105 came to Little
99. Id. at 5.
100. Motion for New Trial, State of Arkansas v. H.L. Tharp, Fall Term 1893.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Plea of Former Acquittal, State of Arkansas v. H.L. Tharp, Fall Term 1894. The Plea of
Former Acquittal offers a detailed account of the jury’s deliberations:
That said jury after due consideration of all the degrees of homicide embraces in the
charge against him, all agreed that the defendant was guilty of “Involuntary Manslaugh-
ter” and so rendered their verdict, thus acquitting the defendant of all the grades of
homicide embraced in said indictment, except said charge of “Involuntary Manslaugh-
ter”; the record of which said verdict is here referred to and made a part hereof.
That after such verdict and agreement was reached by the jury, the several members of
the jury then differed as to the length of time which the defendant should serve in the
penitentiary for said offence of “Involuntary Manslaughter”, some being in favor of
assessing or fixing his punishment at Six months in the State Penitentiary, and others for
a less time, and none for a less time than one day . . . .
Id. at 2. As fits the pattern with chance verdicts, in a charged case that challenged a community’s
values, the jurors could not agree, and so used a quotient method to settle their differences.
104. McCauley was heavily involved in the Arkansas press during those years; one paper
described him as “the rampant greenback editor of the Record, awhile back.” Sounds from Searcy,
DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock, Arkansas), Nov. 15, 1883, at 9, http://www.newspapers.com/
image/131007266. In 1884, McCauley was himself acquitted of assassinating a rival in Pleasant
Plains. See Fully Vindicated, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock, Arkansas), Dec. 9, 1884, at 1,
http://www.newspapers.com/image/131010188. Before heading to Little Rock in October 1893,
McCauley had been appointed by Governor Fishback as a delegate to the Bimetallic Association
Congress in St. Louis. Bimetallism, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock, Arkansas), Sept. 21, 1893,
at 4, http://www.newspapers.com/image/132650610. The connections did not stop there. Later, in
November of 1893, Governor Fishback offered a $250 reward for information on a murder com-
mitted in Independence County; McCauley was listed as the solicitor. The State in Brief, SOUTH-
ERN STANDARD (Arkadelphia, Arkansas), Nov. 3, 1893, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/
280301314.
105. Denton was also a newsman, the editor of the Batesville Bee. See Personal Points, DAILY
ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock, Arkansas), Feb. 14, 1895, at 3, http://www.newspapers.com/image/
132656420; see also Arkansas Press Association, OSCEOLA TIMES (Osceola, Arkansas), July 22,
1893, at 4, http://www.newspapers.com/image/274143474 (referencing Denton as a prominent
member of the Arkansas Press Association, and “the bravest and truest of men”). He was else-
where listed as a well-known Democrat from Batesville. Convention Chat, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE
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Rock to appeal to the Governor of Arkansas, William Fishback, to pardon
Tharp.106 The Gazette reported that “Mr. Denton says nearly every citizen,
man and woman in Batesville ask the pardon; that the Judge, prosecutor and
jury are also in favor of his pardon.”107 In reciting the history of the case,
the paper identified Mason as the “traducer” of Tharp, again implying guilt
on the part of the victim.108
William Fishback was a poor fit for the petition to overturn a chance
verdict. A Democrat who had supported both secession and Unionism dur-
ing the Civil War, he took office during a Democratic wave election in
1892 that swept all sitting African American state legislators from office.109
His brief tenure was largely focused on “public relations activities designed
(Little Rock, Arkansas), Sept. 23, 1896, at 3, http://www.newspapers.com/image/132661686.
Denton and McCauley had in fact served in the same Confederate regiment, the 8th Arkansas
Infantry, during the Civil War, Denton as a Second Lieutenant and McCauley as a Captain. See
Frank D. Denton, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail
.htm?soldierId=4F38DA95-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A; see also George W. McCauley,
NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail.htm?soldierId=89CA44
B7-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A.
106. See Pardon Wanted, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock, Arkansas), Oct. 18, 1893, at 8,
http://www.newspapers.com/image/132618853.
107. Id. The inclusion of the judge and jury in this list raises a troubling question: when is
punishment warranted when a community is unanimous in its belief that a criminal act is un-
problematic? But if the paper is to be believed, then the community was united in its belief that
Mason’s transgressions were properly punished by Tharp. See EDWARDS, supra note 78, at 90
(“Law was the arena where southerners went when they wanted to restore harmony—as they
conceived of it—to the social order.”). The mention of the judge and jury also suggests a kind of
“community jury nullification” effort by the local authorities acting in concert.
108. Pardon Wanted, supra note 106, at 8. The word “traducer” is defined as a “defamer” or a
“slanderer.” Traducer, THE OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015), www.oed.com/view/Entry/
204322; see also Traduce, THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000) (defining “traduce” as
“to cause humiliation or disgrace by making malicious and false statements.”). The use of this
word in the context of Tharp was part of the media’s efforts to paint Mason as deserving of what
he got. In another instance of a man slandering another man’s wife, the Pine Daily Bluff Graphic
reported approvingly that “[t]he judgment of the court was that Shank [the traducer] got what he
deserved, but that Gosh [the husband] was technically guilty of assault, and he was fined 5c.”
Thrashed His Wife’s Traducer, PINE BLUFF DAILY GRAPHIC (Pine Bluff, Arkansas), Mar. 2, 1894,
at 2, http://www.newspapers.com/image/273398056; see also Killed His Traducer, SOUTHERN
STANDARD (Arkadelphia, Arkansas), Aug. 25, 1893, at 4, http://www.newspapers.com/image/
280299344 (discussing yet another instance where a man killed a man who slandered his wife).
The word also carried a particular resonance for Southerners who perceived their culture and
dignity as besieged by the North as Reconstruction ended. See DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock,
Arkansas), Jan. 25, 1895, at 4, http://www.newspapers.com/image/132655846 (“A WHITE [sic]
constable at Vicksburg has been sentenced to imprisonment for life for shooting a negro. The
professional traducers of the South will not obtain much comfort from the verdict of this jury.”)
(emphasis added). The papers even used the word when discussing the efforts of Governor
Fishback to defend the South’s honor. See OSCEOLA TIMES (Osceola, Arkansas), July 1, 1893, at
1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/274143442 (“[Governor Fishback] is the right man in the
right place. Doing much, not only, towards the advancement of the material interests of his own
State; but, in conferring lasting benefits upon our common South, by defending her against the
ignorance and malice of her traducers.”).
109. Harry W. Readnour, William Meade Fishback (1831–1903), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARK.,
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=103 (last updated
Dec. 3, 2018).
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to help dispel the perception that Arkansas was still a wilderness peopled by
ignorant squatters.”110 Like many other Southern politicians of his era,111
Fishback was hugely invested in rehabilitating the South’s reputation after
Reconstruction.112 In short, McCauley and Denton came to Fishback seek-
ing the precise type of relief—ratification of community values over the
law—that Fishback was trying to publicly disdain. But their request may
not have been completely doomed.113
The Daily Arkansas Gazette reported on October 19, 1893, that
Denton and McCauley had failed. The article made no mention of a chance
or quotient verdict. But the governor issued a passionate response to the
petition, where he ironically endorsed the outcome of a quotient verdict in
the name of upholding the rule of law.114 Fishback wrote:
The large number of ladies and gentlemen who were led by their
generous, and I may add, their ennobling sympathies, to sign the
petition for the pardon of H.L. Tharp recently found guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to sixty-two days in the
Penitentiary, have evidently not sufficiently reflected upon what
they ask of the Governor.
Who or what Tharp, or his wife, or Mason may be is not selevant
[sic]. We live in a land of law and order. We must uphold both or
we must relapse into anarchy and barbarism. The Governor is
sworn to uphold the law.
In all well regulated and civilized communities the law affords
ample redress for wrongs.
110. Id.
111. See generally DANIEL J. SHARFSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE LINE: A SECRET HISTORY OF RACE
IN AMERICA (2011) (discussing Randall Gibson).
112. In 1890, politicians from thirteen southern states penned a book dedicated to the busi-
nessmen of the North; Fishback wrote the chapter on Arkansas. William Fishback, Reconstruction
in Arkansas, in WHY THE SOLID SOUTH? OR, RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS RESULTS 294 (1890)
(“Crimination and recrimination are as repugnant to good taste as they are to my own
inclination.”).
113. Because Fishback’s tenure was so short, few records of his time in office have survived
(or more likely, no one bothered to keep them). One letter that did survive was penned from
Governor Fishback to Governor Matthews of Indiana. The letter stated: “I have referred your letter
together with petition to the Judge by whom the case of J.H. Jones was tried. I know nothing of
the facts as yet.” Letter from William M. Fishback, Governor of Ark., to Claude Matthews, Gov-
ernor of Ind. (Apr. 28, 1894) (located at Rare Books and Manuscripts, Indiana State Library,
Collection S0931, Folder 1). This letter implies that Fishback was willing to petition individual
judges, if not issue pardons. Petitioning for executive clemency had been a routine component of
the justice system in the South for decades. See EDWARDS, supra note 78, at 77–78 (discussing the
history of executive clemency applications and community petitions post-trial). Further, Denton
and McCauley probably believed they could leverage their relationships with Fishback to get
Tharp off.
114. The Pardon of Tharp, ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock, Arkansas), Oct. 19, 1893, at 8, http://
www.newspapers.com/image/132618861. Fishback’s letter falls into a long line of decisions to
uphold mischievous verdicts in the name of public order. See generally Tanner v. United States,
483 U.S. 107 (1987).
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If a person slander another in Arkansas, the laws of the State af-
fords the slandered party both civil and criminal redress. But the
same law that protects the slandered also protects the slanderer.
He has the inalienable right to a trial by a jury of his peers, to face
his accusers before legally constituted tribunals and to prove his
innocence if he can.
In this case Tharp took the law in his own hands, and, acting as a
jury, judge and executioner shot Mason to death without any re-
gard to his legal rights . . . .
To interfere with the sentence of the court in this case would be a
betrayal of trust, and I feel quite sure that I do not over-estimate
[sic] the intelligence and patriotism of the good people who,
under the influence of a generous impulse, have signed this peti-
tion, when I predict that when their calmer judgment shall have
asserted itself, they will thank me that I have protected, not only
the social order but themselves from the results of their own un-
due, pardonable excitement, by declining to comply with their
request.115
There are several important takeaways from this letter. First, there seems to
have been no doubt in Fishback’s mind that Tharp committed the crime.
Second, the language is rights-based, but the person entitled to that right is
Mason. Third, the governor made no mention of the quotient method. Pre-
sumably, Denton and McCauley mentioned this during their meeting as a
ground for the pardon.116 On the whole, the letter served to bolster
Fishback’s image in the press as committed to the rule of law and to the
processing by the justice system of extrajudicial killings. While there is no
record of how the pardon letter was received back in Pleasant Plains, what
happened next seems to suggest that the local judiciary was waiting to see
what the governor’s move would be.
On October 25, 1893, less than a week after the governor’s letter ap-
peared in the press, newspapers across the region reported that Tharp had
been granted a new trial. The story stated that “[t]he verdict was set aside
by the circuit Judge because the jury arrived at it by casting lots.”117 Un-
doubtedly, the conflation of the quotient verdict used by the jury and the
specter of a full chance verdict raised Tharp’s profile in his hometown and
115. The Pardon of Tharp, supra note 114. Fishback’s characterization of the townspeople as
the inflamed jurors of the situation rings oddly true. In defending the legal process, he was admit-
ting that the community was the cause of the tension.
116. In some sense, Fishback could have issued a pardon and cited the miscreant jurors for
contravening the rule of law had he thought the case worthy of executive clemency.
117. Granted a New Trial, EVENING MESSENGER (Marshall, Texas), Oct. 25, 1893, at 3, http://
www.newspapers.com/image/320046501; Granted a New Trial, PINE BLUFF DAILY GRAPHIC
(Pine Bluff, Arkansas), Oct. 26, 1893, at 2, http://www.newspapers.com/image/273395816 (same
story); see also The News Briefed, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS (Gavelston, Texas), Oct. 27, 1893, at
1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/21766418; Tharp Secures New Trial, SOUTHERN STANDARD
(Arkadelphia, Arkansas), Oct. 27, 1893, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/280301199.
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throughout the region. It certainly served the newspaper’s narrative well;
the articles again used the word “traducer” to make Tharp more sympa-
thetic. The quick turnaround also suggests that the judge was willing to at
least give Tharp a second bite at the apple given the irregularity of the
verdict and the lack of a pardon. The judge’s ruling on this issue—presum-
ing one existed—does not appear in the case file. It is difficult to assess
whether it was generally accepted that the statutory exception allowing ju-
rors to testify as to chance verdicts encompassed quotient methods. In any
case, the legal arguments may have been a secondary concern for the local
bar relative to the outpouring of community support that Tharp received.
The final chapter of Tharp’s story supports this latter narrative. Two
years later, in October of 1895, a retrial was held. Tharp was acquitted.118
The Daily Arkansas Gazette again discussed Mason’s conduct in conde-
scending terms,119 and repeated the story that the initial jury arrived at the
verdict by lot.120 The story also stated that the case had been continued
through several terms of court and that the jury had acquitted after a two-
day trial and roughly a full day and a half of deliberating. “[H]is many
friends are greatly rejoiced at his acquittal.”121 This outcome is significant
because there was never any doubt as to the facts of the case. It is clear that
Tharp shot Mason in a fit of rage. It is also clear that the community and the
media felt that the killing was justified.
The Tharp case is another classic chance verdict that shares many of
the characteristics with the normative schema. A case with a sympathetic
defendant comes to trial, and the pressure prompts the jury to use a quotient
or chance method to arrive at a damages figure. The media treats the verdict
as a scandal. In this case, the media and Governor Fishback fit the case in
with larger concerns about the rule of law in Arkansas in the 1890s: the
media connected the case to attempts to defame the South by using the
word “traduce”; Governor Fishback fit the case into his project of persuad-
ing people that the state was not a lawless backwater. But in the end, the
community’s belief that Tharp should not be punished for breaking the law
won out.122
118. H.L. Tharp Acquitted: He Killed a Man for Slandering His Wife, ARK. GAZETTE (Little
Rock, Arkansas), Oct. 4, 1895, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/132647885.
119. Id. (“Prof. Tharp shot and killed one Mason, who had circulated slanderous reports
against Mrs. Tharp and refused to retract them, although untrue.”).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. As had been true decades earlier, “legal legitimacy belonged to the people who lived with
the results.” EDWARDS, supra note 78, at 78; see also id. at 83 (“[T]he remedy for individual
offenders was reintegration into the community, not expulsion from it.”).
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D. “A Jury of Very Questionable Character”: Bar Fight in a Knoxville
Dive
Tennessee courts were also no stranger to quotient verdicts. In 1839,
Justice Turley of the Tennessee Supreme Court123 ruled twice in the same
year on quotient verdict cases.124 Later decisions highlighted concerns
about jurors deciding cases based on their judgment rather than based on an
interloper’s numerical prejudice,125 but courts distinguished between full
quotient and working quotient verdict cases.126 Tennessee is also a state
where jurors may testify as to “quotient or gambling verdict” via an explicit
exception to the state’s version of Rule 606(b), rather than solely via statu-
tory exception.127
The next chapter in the history of chance verdicts is crucial because it
concerns a racially motivated murder. On June 27, 1884, the owner of a
Knoxville dive, L.A.M. Perkey,128 stabbed an African American man, Sam
Franklin, in the bar.129 The murder was particularly violent, with Franklin
suffering six stab wounds to the abdomen and dying shortly thereafter.130
123. Russell Fowler, William B. Turley, TENN. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 8, 2017), https://tennessee
encyclopedia.net/entries/william-b-turley.
124. In the first case, Bennett v. Baker, 20 Tenn. 399 (1839), a single juror performed the
quotient calculation and then suggested that number as the jury’s verdict; the jury agreed. Justice
Turley wrote that because the jury knew the number they were voting on, there was no interloper
problem and no agreement in advance to abide by an unknown. Id. at 401. In the second case,
Elledge v. Todd, 20 Tenn. 43 (1839), a classic full quotient verdict case, the plaintiff alleged
damages of $500. One juror wrote down $250 on his slip of paper, and another wrote down $0. Id.
at 44. Justice Turley reversed and remanded in a short opinion. Id. at 45.
125. See, e.g., Crabtree v. State, 35 Tenn. 302, 303 (1855) (“The defendant, as well as the
state, is entitled to the unbiased judgment of the whole as well as every member of the jury, as to
the amount of punishment to be inflicted for the crime of which the defendant is convicted.”).
Crabtree is one of the very few decisions that speaks of a “right” that is held by both the defen-
dant and the state.
126. See Glidewell v. State, 83 Tenn. 133, 136 (1885) (explaining that there was no agreement
to abide by the quotient).
127. See TENN. R. EVID. 606(b).
128. Perkey was something of a known quantity in Knoxville. In 1881, he was listed amongst
quarreling Democratic leaders in Knoxville. General News, MORRISTOWN GAZETTE (Morristown,
Tennessee), May 25, 1881, at 3, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85033681/1881-05-25/
ed-1/seq-3. In 1882, he was charged with carrying weapons. Court Reports, DAILY CHRONICLE,
KNOXVILLE (Knoxville, Tennessee), May 3, 1882, at 4, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/
sn85033437/1882-05-03/ed-1/seq-4. Sometime before 1884, he sued the city of Knoxville for
damages sustained to his wagon due to poor road maintenance. See Tennessee Supreme Court
Cases, TENN. SECRETARY OF STATE, https://supreme-court-cases.tennsos.org (search “perkey” in
search bar; select 1884 case). He was a member of the International Typographical Union No. 111
in Knoxville. INT’L TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND
ANNUAL SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 218 (1884), https://books.goo
gle.com/books?id=tThVXOFeTrAC&dq=LAM%20perkey&pg=PA218#v=onepage&q=LAM
%20perkey&f=false (listing L.A.M. Perkey as a member).
129. Sam Franklin, Colored, Killed in a Market Street Dive, DAILY AM. (Nashville, Tenn.),
June 29, 1884, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/118991130.
130. Id.
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From the very beginning, the case brought the community to its feet.131 The
media also seemed to side with Franklin.132 Aside from the quotient verdict
(which occurred during one of several retrials), a witness named Kanipe
was charged with perjury during the investigation.133 Over the course of the
next year, the case was tried at least three times,134 with the papers noting
the difficulty at each turn.135
As the third trial came to a close in September of 1885, the Daily
American perturbedly noted:
The public awaits the verdict with anxiety, as an index to a
change since the late mob . . . . Owing to the prejudice aroused at
this time, the Judge and whole Court felt different degrees of re-
straint. The sense of the community is that mobs are not needed to
rebuke our courts.”136
The Daily American’s polemic against the crowds (and its earlier coverage
in 1884 that the crowd was largely African American) suggests that there
were explicit racial overtones to the series of trials. The newspaper de-
fended the local justice system’s handling of the troubled case, while
groups continued to appear to watch the proceedings. At the end of the third
trial, the jury finally reached a verdict and found Perkey guilty of man-
131. On Trial for Murder, DAILY AM. (Nashville, Tenn.), July 2, 1884, at 1, http://www.news
papers.com/image/118991700 (noting that bail was denied and that the courthouse was crowded
with African American spectators who followed the prisoners to jail, “but no violence was
attempted.”).
132. See Over the State, PLATEAU GAZETTE AND EAST TENN. NEWS (Rugby, Tenn.), July 3,
1884, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/174657998 (“Lewis Perkey, the keeper of a low
saloon in Knoxville, a few days ago stabbed to death, in a fit of passion, an inoffensive negro
named Sam Franklin.”).
133. Held for Trial on a Charge of Perjury, DAILY AM. (Nashville, Tenn.), July 5, 1884, at 1,
http://www.newspapers.com/image/118992126 (“A case against Wm. Knipe [sic], who is charged
with perjury in testifying crookedly in the Perkey murder investigation, has been concluded after
two days delay in examining witnesses. He was committed in default of bond.”). The minutes of
the Criminal Court are difficult to read, but it seems that Kanipe’s perjury concerned the allega-
tion that Perkey’s co-defendant, Cowan, grabbed Franklin during the fight and brought him back
over to Perkey, who then continued assaulting Franklin. Transcript of Record at 18–19, State v.
Kanipe (Sept. 19, 1884), microfilmed on Volume 14 (Knox Cty. Archives).
134. Argument Concluded in the Perkey Murder Trial, DAILY AM. (Nashville, Tenn.), Sept.
13, 1885, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/119193350 (“This is the third trial of the pris-
oner, and instead of the mob, and the resulting excitement having a salutary influence on the court,
quite the reverse has been the result.”) (emphasis added).
135. See Perkey Jury Disagree, DAILY AM. (Nashville, Tenn.), May 26, 1885, at 1, http://
www.newspapers.com/image/119184643 (noting that the jury had been discharged after deadlock-
ing 10-2 in favor of acquittal); see also No Jury Yet in the Perkey Case, COMET (Johnson City,
Tennessee), Sept. 10, 1885, at 2, http://www.newspapers.com/image/174066195 (“Another day
has passed in the criminal court without a jury being completed in the case of L.A.M. Perkey,
charged with the murder of Sam Franklin.”).
136. Argument Concluded in the Perkey Murder Trial, supra note 134.
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slaughter.137 An appeal was taken, and the case was sent to the Tennessee
Supreme Court.138
The record sent to the supreme court contains a detailed accounting of
what transpired at trial. Ben Franklin, Sam’s father, testified that Sam had
been working as a musician performing in a string band at Perkey’s bar.139
Ben Franklin also testified that after the fight, he stayed with his son as he
lay dying in the street outside the bar.140 A policeman who witnessed por-
tions of the fight testified that Perkey said to Franklin, “No darn black son
of a bitch should call [Perkey] a son of a bitch.”141 The record also con-
tained the affidavits of several jurors, who testified that they used a quotient
method to assess the length of imprisonment and agreed to abide by that
result.142
In November 1885, the Comet reported that the Tennessee Supreme
Court had remanded the case.143 A few months later, Perkey was found not
guilty during the fourth retrial of the case.144 Quoting another newspaper,
the Herald and Tribune reported that the defense presented new evidence
“going to prove threats and preparations on the part of Franklin towards
Perkey’s life.”145
While the surviving evidence does not clearly prove that the defense
manufactured this evidence demonstrating some form of culpability or evil
137. From Knoxville, COMET (Johnson City, Tenn.), Sept. 17, 1885, at 2, https://chronicling
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn89058128/1885-09-17/ed-1/seq-2 (“The jury in the Perkey trial to-day
[sic] found a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, with a sentence of five years in the penitentiary.
A motion for new trial was entered.”).
138. The Tennessee Supreme Court holds records relating to the appeal. See Tennessee Su-
preme Court Cases, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://supreme-court-cases.tennsos.org (search
“perkey” in search bar; click on 1885 case).
139. Case file of State v. L.A.M. Perkey & James Cowan 46–47 (testimony of Ben Franklin)
(maintained by Tennessee State Library & Archives, Box ET 1908); see also id. at 58 (testimony
of Dan Listen, policeman).
140. Id. at 48 (testimony of Ben Franklin).
141. Id. at 55 (testimony of Dan Listen).
142. Id. at 153 (affidavit of A.J. Hood, juror).
143. General News, COMET (Johnson City, Tenn.), Nov. 12, 1885, at 3, https://chronicling
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn89058128/1885-11-12/ed-1/seq-3/ (“The Supreme Court at Knoxville, last
Saturday, reversed the decision of the criminal court in the case of L.A.M. Perkey, sentenced to
the penitentiary five years for murder, and remanded the case for trial.”). The Herald and Tribune
reported that “[a]n appeal to the Supreme Court was taken on the grounds of a ‘gambling verdict,’
and the case was remanded to the lower court for another trial.” Four Reversals by the Supreme
Court, HERALD & TRIB. (Jonesborough, Tenn.), Nov. 12, 1885, at 2, https://www.newspapers
.com/image/171510651/?terms=%22sam+franklin%22. The Supreme Court’s record says much
the same. See Minute Books of the Eastern Division of the Tennessee Supreme Court (1884–88)
506–07 (maintained by Tennessee State Library and Archives).
144. Pencilings, MARYVILLE TIMES (Maryville, Tenn.), Jan. 20, 1886, at 1, http://chronicling
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn89058370/1886-01-20/ed-1/seq-1 (“L.A.M. Perkey was acquitted of mur-
der by a Jury, at Knoxville last Monday.”).
145. General News, HERALD & TRIB. (Jonesboro, Tenn.), Jan. 21, 1886, at 3, https://www
.newspapers.com/image/171497860/?terms=%22sam+franklin%22. The newspaper coyly added,
“[t]his does not help Perkey out of his trouble yet, however. He has a workhouse judgment hang-
ing over him for costs, to the amount of about $100, for retailing liquor without a bond.” Id.
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intent on Franklin’s part, four facts suggest this conclusion. The first clue is
that the African American community gathered at the proceedings of trial,
suggesting that they at least attached to Franklin’s case some measure of
import. Second, an unbiased jury was difficult to come by,146 suggesting
that the case carried perverse resonance for a racially divided community.
Third, the testimony of Officer Listen suggests that Franklin may have sim-
ply insulted Perkey by calling him a “son of a bitch.” Fourth, if evidence
existed showing that Franklin threatened Perkey, why did the defense wait
until the fourth trial to present it?
The quotient verdict fits the schema in a number of different ways.
First, there does not seem to be any doubt as to the fact that Perkey mur-
dered Franklin. Second, the jury could manage to agree on guilt but seem-
ingly could not muster the will to compromise on an actual quantification of
that guilt for sentencing. In other words, the jury resorted to a chance
method because the case was so charged for certain jurors—or made them
so stubborn—that the quotient method was the only way to make everyone
feel heard and allow the jurors to leave. Third, the media storm omitted the
fact that the case was a quotient verdict rather than a chance verdict, simply
noting cursorily that a “gambling verdict” had been overturned.
The Perkey case is significant because it shows that the history of
chance verdicts tracks the history of community unrest in America relating
to race. The Dickson case was a species of early tort liability as Americans
came to terms with the new machines barreling around their streets, and
Perkey was a case in which white attorneys used the stigma attaching to
chance verdicts to exonerate a clearly guilty white defendant accused of
murdering a black musician in his bar. It shows that the history of racial
injustice walked hand in hand with the history of chance verdicts. It also
demonstrates that the third Perkey jury did what it did because the case was
high profile. The fourth Perkey jury came to the same conclusion as the
second Tharp jury: it didn’t matter that Perkey and Tharp were guilty of the
crimes. The community did not want to punish them. In this sense, it might
be said that these juries performed a sort of graceless attempt at nullifica-
tion in using chance methods to convince all the jurors that the sentence
was fair, or at least that every juror had been heard.
146. Argument Concluded in the Perkey Murder Trial, supra note 134 (“In the first place, it
was almost impossible to secure a jury at all. The counsel took advantage of the excitement to
make an unusual number of challenges resulting in a jury of very questionable character.”) (em-
phasis added) (discussing third trial).
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E. “The Liberty of a Citizen Has Been Gambled Away in a Jury-
Room”: The Mob at Work
One of the earliest reports of a chance verdict in the Ohio Reports is
Goins v. State,147 although the Ohio Supreme Court had generally consid-
ered juror misconduct before.148 The case arose out of the aftermath of an
extremely bloody election night riot in Lima, Ohio, in 1888.149 During the
night after a particularly contested election, an African American man
named William Goins and an Irish man named Tim Casey, came to blows
at a restaurant.150 After the fight, Goins and some compatriots went looking
for Casey. Casey’s compatriots did the same, and a riot ensued in which
several men were grievously injured by razors and knives.151 Goins was
arrested during the fight, and later that evening, was rushed away by his
jailors to a different prison so that the mob could not locate him.152
Over the next few months, other defendants were tried for the murders;
one received a twenty-year sentence.153 Because Goins’ trial as an acces-
sory was secondary to the preceding trials, the case received less public
attention.154 There was still a great deal of difficulty in securing a jury and
lining up approximately sixty-one witnesses to testify.155 At the end of the
trial, Goins was convicted of second degree murder, despite the fact that it
was clear that Goins had only used his fists in the otherwise deadly,
weapon-ridden bout.156
147. Goins v. State, 21 N.E. 476 (Ohio 1889). Goins is a hybrid full chance verdict case
because the jury flipped a coin to decide whether to convict for manslaughter or murder in the
second degree, rather than to assess guilt or innocence. See id. at 482.
148. See Hayward v. Calhoun, 2 Ohio St. 164, 165 (1853) (If “it appears that any fraud or
imposition has been practiced, by which a fair trial has been prevented by an impartial jury . . .
and which could not have been prevented by proper vigilance on his part, the court, on applica-
tion, should set aside the verdict, and grant a new trial.”).
149. The Goins case has been fairly well documented thanks to the efforts of the Allen County
Museum & Historical Society, which assisted in producing a writeup of the case in 2014. See
Election Day 1888 Ends in Violence, LIMA NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.limaohio.com/
archive/20316/news-news_lifestyles-795986-election-day-1888-ends-in-violence.
150. Id.
151. Terrible Tragedy at Lima, SPRINGFIELD DAILY REPUBLIC (Ohio), Apr. 4, 1888, at 2,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn87076917/1888-04-04/ed-1/seq-2/ (“Hughes’ heart was
cut in two with a razor, and Gallagher and Stockey were fatally slashed.”). See Cut with Razors,
WICHITA DAILY EAGLE, Apr. 4, 1888, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/215070614; see
also Triple Murder in Lima, O.: Two Colored Men Fatally Stab Three White Men – One’s Heart
Split, PLAIN SPEAKER (Hazleton, Penn.), Apr. 5, 1888, at 3, http://www.newspapers.com/image/
98125699.
152. Election Day 1888 Ends in Violence, supra note 149, at 2.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. (“By the time Goins went on trial in December 1888, much of the passion surround-
ing the case had died down.”).
155. William Goins’ Murder Trial, LIMA NEWS (Ohio), Dec. 5, 1888, at 7, http://www.news
papers.com/image/45958936.
156. Election Day 1888 Ends in Violence, supra note 149, at 3.
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In mid-December 1888, it became clear that the verdict was the result
of chance.157 The jurors had been evenly split between a verdict for man-
slaughter and second degree murder, and so twelve slips of paper (twelve
reading “manslaughter” and the other twelve reading “murder”) were put
into a hat.158 Amusingly, the first drawing resulted in a tie—six-to-six
again.159 The second “drawing” out of the hat produced eight “ballots” for
murder, and four for manslaughter; so the jury reported a verdict for mur-
der.160 In other words, the method the jury used was a full chance verdict
but was an agreement to use chance as between two different sentences
known to the jury.
As befits the pattern of chance verdicts, the newspapers went wild. The
Detroit Free Press noted that the verdict made no sense in light of the fact
that the more complicit perpetrators received lighter sentences,161 while the
Perrysburg Journal called the verdict “outrageous.”162 Unlike other chance
verdicts, the media’s outrage was not unanimous. One newspaper simply
reported a month later that Goins had been convicted.163 The Daily Demo-
157. Id. Interestingly, the papers keeping close tabs on the case reported at first that Goins had
been found guilty, and that “the result of this finding will result in William Goins being buried
from the sight of the outer world for the remainder of his natural life.” For Life! William Goins
Found Guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, DAILY DEMOCRATIC TIMES (Lima, Ohio), Dec. 13,
1888, at 1. After naming the twelve jurors and their home townships, the article noted after that
“[t]hey were all gentlemen of mature age and were of the intelligent class of people of this coun-
try. The voting on a verdict from the start was six for murder in the second degree and six for
manslaughter.” Id. Perhaps a chance verdict had not yet been alleged when the article was re-
leased, but the praise heaped on the jurors is fascinating because it demonstrates that the newspa-
pers were prepared to depict jurors as wise, common-sense folk instead of marauding gamblers. It
is also possible that the authors wanted to construct a more favorable version of the narrative that
Goins’ conviction was fair. The Daily Democratic Times has not been completely digitized, and
the Allen County Historical Society graciously provided the author with copies of the relevant
pages. Some issues do appear under the category “The Lima News” on newspapers.com. See LIMA
NEWS, https://www.newspapers.com/title_886/the_lima_news/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
158. Trusted to Chance: How the Jury in the William Goins Murder Case Arrived at a Ver-




162. An Outrageous Verdict, PERRYSBURG J. (Ohio), Dec. 21, 1888, at 1, https://chronicling
america.loc.gov/lccn/sn87076843/1888-12-21/ed-1/seq-1.
163. State News Items, NEWS-HERALD (Hillsboro, Ohio), Jan. 17, 1889, at 2, https://chronic
lingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85038161/1889-01-17/ed-1/seq-2/ (“The jury in the Patrick Hughes
murder case at Lima returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree against William
Goins, colored, indicted as one of the accessories.”). It may be too great a leap to assume that the
paper’s mention of Goins’ race bespeaks a lack of concern for the fate of an African American
prisoner. The paper’s reporting on Goins’ later acquittal was similarly muted. See State News
Items, NEWS-HERALD (Hillsboro, Ohio), Jan. 2, 1890, at 3, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/
lccn/sn85038161/1890-01-02/ed-1/seq-3.
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cratic Times took a different tack, issuing an editorial objecting to the ad-
mission of juror affidavits; a chance verdict was never mentioned.164
True to their word, Goins’ attorneys appealed the decision to the Ohio
Supreme Court,165 and again the newspapers howled with rage at the
chance aspect of the verdict as they reported on the appeal.166 In a lengthy
treatment of the case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and re-
manded.167 The court recited the facts of the verdict, and expressed its dis-
content at the posture of the submission of juror affidavits:
The almost unbroken current of authority supports this holding
[excluding the affidavits], . . . and thus it may appear to all the
world, by the subsequent statements of jurors, that the liberty of a
citizen has been gambled away in a jury-room, yet the court is
powerless to interfere, because the policy of the law is – First, to
164. Not Satisfied, DAILY DEMOCRATIC TIMES (Lima, Ohio), Dec. 31, 1888, at 4, https://www
.newspapers.com/image/45962347/?terms=%22Mr.+Halfhill+cited%22. The Times quoted a rival
paper, The Gazette, which had printed the arguments, and retorted:
The above is but a specimen of their former ravings regarding the result of the William
Goins murder trial and shows very clearly their opinion of justice, when they virtually
ask a Judge to set aside all regard for law for the sole purpose of aiding a man tried for
murder to get a lighter sentence.
Id. (emphasis added). This counter-narrative shows that the politics of the case were so charged
that the editors felt it necessary (or, felt that it was good business) to wade deep into the weeds of
legal argument to show the result of the Goins trial was fair. Less than a month earlier, inter-
spersed with inline advertisements, the paper’s editors had asked, “[w]ill the jury in the Goins case
be more consistent in the rendering of a verdict in this case than the jury in the Sam Thomas case?
Will they render a verdict according to the evidence, or will their judgment be warped by their
political beliefs?” General News, DAILY DEMOCRATIC TIMES (Lima, Ohio), Dec. 7, 1888, at 7,
https://www.newspapers.com/image/45959307/?terms=goins. In other words, the newspaper took
the side it thought (or knew) its readers would.
165. Goins was represented by a prominent Republican lawyer in Lima named James W.
Halfhill, whose biography in later life mentioned the Goins case. See 1 GEORGE IRVING REED,
James W. Halfhill, in BENCH AND BAR OF OHIO 357, 357 (1897) (“It is the case in which the
verdict was determined by a method as reprehensible as that adopted by the Louisiana Lottery
Company, and which caused the Supreme Court of the State to grant a new trial, resulting in the
acquittal of the prisoner.”); see also id. at 371 (biography of the prosecutor, Isaac Motter). Goins’
other attorney in the case was James Price, who later became a local judge. See 1 GEORGE IRVING
REED, James L. Price in BENCH AND BAR OF OHIO 324–25 (1897). Price’s biography contains a
more detailed account of the case. Id. Reed’s account of the brawl differs from the newspapers,
which reported that Goins and his friends played a part in starting the trouble. Reed’s portrayal of
the attorneys as the heroic white saviors of the poor, black man served to bolster Price’s image in
the book.
166. The Cincinnati Enquirer wrote:
The prisoner, his attorneys and friends claim to have information to the effect that the
verdict of the jury was arrived at by flipping coppers [sic][f]or a decision. . . . Unfortu-
nately for Goins, “tails” turned up, and, according to report, Goins was sentenced to
imprisonment for life as a result of a game of chance.
Flipping Coppers On the Fate of a Prisoner, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 11, 1889, at 4,
https://www.newspapers.com/image/31312696 (emphasis added). The Akron Times was similarly
galled. AKRON CITY TIMES, Mar. 20, 1889, at 2, http://www.newspapers.com/image/228085021
(“After this case is settled the court ought to turn its attention from the prisoner to the jurors who
convicted him. If gambling in grain is a penitentiary offense juggling with a human life ought to
be so.”) (emphasis added).
167. Goins v. State, 21 N.E. 476 (Ohio 1889).
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seclude the jury; and second, not to allow their evidence to im-
peach their verdict . . . . But a case like this at bar strains the
principle to its utmost tension, and suggests a doubt whether there
may not be found a carefully guarded exception to the rule, the
universal application of which may present a spectacle so discred-
itable to our jury system.168
The court ended its analysis by noting that the chance verdict issue did not
decide the case, but the proceeding clearly troubled the court and likely
informed its decision-making on the other dispositive issues in the appeal.
The court’s analysis is also important because it recognizes a crucial
reality: jurors talk. The outcome—and more importantly, the outcome’s
narrative in the public sphere—goes beyond the confines of a courtroom
where the evidence cannot be received. The method used by the jury made a
mockery of the proceedings, and the trial court’s refusal to admit the juror
affidavits “left the allegation of misconduct without proof.”169 But the alle-
gation—and the fact that it stood unchallenged by counteraffidavits—nev-
ertheless tainted the proceeding. The newspapers were certainly
unconcerned with the court’s resolution of the other issues in the appeal.170
William Goins, who had been in jail during the pendency of his ap-
peal,171 was eventually acquitted on Christmas Eve of 1889.172 In its Christ-
mas issue, the Daily Ohio State Journal reported a “complete overthrow of
the copper-flipping verdict” and ended its writeup by stating that “[t]he ver-
dict gives general satisfaction.”173 Goins died three years later of
tuberculosis.174
F. Conclusion
What does all of this history mean when considered as a whole?
Chance verdicts occur along the fault lines of society and law: racial ten-
sions, moral tensions, and the tearing of communities are all common fea-
168. Id. at 482.
169. Id.
170. See Jury Gambling: Verdict Found by Flipping Coppers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 8,
1889, at 1, https://www.newspapers.com/image/32049237/ (mentioning no ground other than the
chance verdict as the reason for the Supreme Court’s reversal); see also Head or Tail?, BUFFALO
COM. ADVERTISER, Mar. 20, 1889, at 1, http://www.newspapers.com/image/269308634 (“The su-
preme court today granted William Goins of Allen county a new trial on a charge of murder in the
second degree on the ground of the jury’s misconduct. They . . . agreed to arrive at a verdict by
flipping a coin.”).
171. Admitted to Bail, MEADVILLE SATURDAY NIGHT (Meadville, Pennsylvania), May 21,
1889, at 2, http://www.newspapers.com/image/295509696 (“Goins has been in jail nearly a
year.”).
172. William Goins Acquitted: The Victim of a Jury Which Drew Cuts Is at Last Set Free,
DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chicago, Ill.), Dec. 25, 1889, at 2, http://www.newspapers.com/image/
33354516 (“This trial was a rehearing of the notorious straw verdict case.”).
173. Goins Acquitted, DAILY OHIO STATE J., Dec. 25, 1889, at 1, http://www.ohiomemory.org/
cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16007coll22/id/67632/rec/1.
174. Election Day 1888 Ends in Violence, supra note 149, at 3.
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tures of cases where chance verdicts can be observed. For legal scholars,
chance verdicts challenge the wisdom and fairness of a jury trial. Are jury
rooms sacrosanct or worthy of scrutiny? The answer is that when commu-
nity tensions overwhelm a jury’s ability to review the evidence before them
(producing a chance verdict), then that jury’s verdict is rarely the last word
on the case.
Chance verdicts also cut to the heart of the jury system. They lay bare
the potential for corrupting the core promise of being judged by one’s peers.
The forceful reactions of the jurists involved in these cases show that the
same strands of argument and debate run through the decades. While the
conclusions of judges as to the merit of those arguments may shift back and
forth over time, the lines remain clearly drawn. Understanding these shifts
in legal culture is paramount at arriving at just outcomes in future cases.
Perspectives may go in and out of fashion, but when those currents are
poorly assessed, the benefit of centuries of thought on these questions is
wasted.
The conditions under which these verdicts were rendered will recur.
The only question is when and how. Indeed, in California in the early
2000s, a partial chance verdict occurred. The next section will examine Cal-
ifornia as a case study and trace the history of chance verdicts in that state,
and show how, when misunderstood or glossed over, history was
misapplied.
III. THE CALIFORNIA FORMULATION: FROM 1855 TO 2005
The strange and tortured narrative of chance verdicts in California
strikes at the heart of what makes these verdicts so contentious.175 Chance
verdicts are so interesting precisely because they raise deep and difficult
questions about how a community should judge its defendants and how
deeply that community should examine its decision-makers’ reasoning after
the fact. Does a defendant have a right to a jury that fairly considers his
case? More pointedly, if such a right exists, how far will a court go to
uncover misconduct abridging that right? In the case of quotient verdicts, is
the influence of a rogue juror corruptingly penetrative or superfluous? Cali-
fornia is one of the few states with a rich record of both legislative and
judicial assessments of chance verdicts. The give and take of different
judges and the legislature zigzags between privileging different conceptions
of the no-impeachment rules. Lawyers exploited the gray areas between
these perspectives. Assessing these trends as a whole demonstrates the
value of these debates to arriving at fair outcomes; in a recent case, the
California courts underexplored this history and allowed a partial chance
verdict to slip through the cracks.
175. A chart synthesizing the cases discussed is appended at Appendix B.
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To begin, it is important to remember that California is one state where
chance verdicts remain enshrined by statute as grounds for a new trial to
this day. On the civil side, chance verdicts have been statutorily codified
since 1862:176
The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modi-
fied or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial
granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the party
aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting
the substantial rights of such party:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or ad-
verse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discre-
tion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial.
2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general
or special verdict, or to a finding on any question sub-
mitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determi-
nation of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors . . . .177
First, notice the breadth of this statute. Juror misconduct is an independent
ground for granting a new trial (denoted by a semicolon following “miscon-
duct of the jury.”). Secondly, the statute empowers “any one” juror to prove
the misconduct by affidavit. In other words, theoretically one credible juror
could undo an entire verdict. The statute also seems to implicate partial
chance verdicts in addition to full chance verdicts. Finally, “resort to the
determination of chance” is undefined, and the confusion arising from this
vague language has produced a troubled line of case law that extends from
1862 to the present day.
On the criminal side, the statute is composed differently, but its codifi-
cation nonetheless demonstrates that legislators felt chance verdicts worthy
of specific mention:
When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made against the
defendant, the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial,
in the following cases only: . . .
4. When the verdict has been decided by lot, or by any
means other than a fair expression of opinion on the part of
all the jurors . . . .178
Importantly, the statute does not contemplate a new trial when a chance
verdict comes out in favor of the defense, even though the same issues are
at play. Secondly, the statute nests an expansive definition (“any means
176. See Act of March 5, 1862, ch. 48, 1862 Cal. Stat. 38–39 (showing the relevant language
in almost the exact same formulation) (emphasis added).
177. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 657 (West 2018) (emphasis added).
178. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West 2018) (emphasis added).
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other than . . . .”) within a narrow class of cases (“in the following cases
only.”).
Opening the door to the jury room is an incredibly intensive exercise
of a trial court’s powers. In reality, courts are reluctant to wield the tools
provided by these statutes. Because granting a new trial is a defendant’s or
disappointed litigant’s ultimate remedy, a judge is unlikely to throw an en-
tire case out on the basis of a single juror’s affidavit, although the statute
allows that outcome. Tracing the evolution of this rule demonstrates the
contention that chance verdicts generate in the legal sphere, and understand-
ing that evolution is crucial to applying its lessons correctly.
Prior to 1862, California followed the common law rule that jurors
could present testimony “substantiating” their verdict but could not “im-
peach” it.179 The 1855 Wilson decision provides a clear window into the
rule courts used before the intervention of the California legislature in 1862.
In Wilson, a full quotient verdict case,180 both a juror and the sheriff sub-
mitted affidavits alleging the misconduct.181 According to the syllabus pre-
ceding Chief Justice Murray’s opinion, the sheriff was in fact present with
the jury during deliberations.182 The court recognized that the sheriff’s affi-
davit was admissible,183 while the juror’s testimony was not.184 Impor-
tantly, the court illustrated with clarity that a “full quotient verdict” and a
“full chance verdict” were effectively the same: “Such verdicts are regarded
in the same light by the courts as gambling verdicts, and will invariably be
set aside, just as if the jury had thrown dice, or resorted to any species of
gaming, to determine the amount.”185 In other words, if a quotient was used
as a platform upon which further discussion proceeded, then the offensive
nature of the quotient receded. The Wilson case is important because it il-
lustrates the common law rule briefly and clearly. The bottom line is that
attacking a verdict was very difficult without the testimony of someone
179. Wilson v. Berryman, 5 Cal. 44, 46 (1855) (“Although jurors will not be allowed to im-
peach their own verdict, still they will be permitted to substantiate it, and this will always be found
a sufficient check against collusion or corruption on the part of the officer having them in
charge.”).
180. Id. at 45 (“In this case, the jury, for the purpose of arriving at a verdict, agreed that each
member should set down a sum according to his own judgment; that the aggregate should be
divided by twelve, and that the quotient should be returned as the verdict; which was done.”).
181. Id. at 46.
182. Id. at 45.
183. Id. at 46 (“In most of the cases, however, in which this question has occurred, the verdict
has been set aside upon the testimony of Sheriffs, and no objection seems to have been taken to
the competency of such evidence.”).
184. Id. (“Although jurors will not be allowed to impeach their own verdict, still they will be
permitted to substantiate it, and this will always be found a sufficient check against collusion or
corruption on the part of the officer having them in charge.”) (emphasis added). The court’s opti-
mism, as we will see, was misplaced.
185. Wilson, 5 Cal. at 46.
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other than a juror. There is no mention in Wilson of the defendant’s rights;
the court speaks only of preserving the order of the jury room.186
A. “That the Secrets of the Jury Room Should Not Be Revealed”:
Wilson, Donner, and The Connections of Mr. Shafter
Assessing state legislative history is notoriously imprecise. But in the
case of California in 1862, thanks to the coverage of newspapers like the
Sacramento Daily Union, we may piece together a rough picture of what
happened. And what happened is nothing short of extraordinary. In the
main, the legislature changed the statute to allow jurors to submit affidavits
to overturn chance verdicts. If the newspapers are to be believed, one legis-
lator drove this change because he stood to benefit financially from a differ-
ent outcome in a chance verdict that recently had been handed down. The
legislative intent was quite simply to target this particular case.
Statutes barring chance verdicts had been on the books in California
for some time, but in a lesser form.187 On February 10, 1862, state senator
Van Dyke introduced the modification to the statute that contemplated juror
testimony in civil cases when verdicts were made “by resort to the determi-
nation of chance.”188 On March 1, 1862, Senator O’Brien was quoted by
the Daily Evening Bulletin discussing a bill relating to wills and trusts and
endorsing the chance verdict bill’s retroactivity.189 Once passed,190 the bill
186. Indeed, the court’s language suggests it considered the jury room sacrosanct: “It has been
suggested that every verdict may be set aside upon the affidavit of a corrupt officer, and that
public policy imperatively demands, that the secrets of the jury room should not be revealed.” Id.
(emphasis added).
187. In a statutory compilation from 1850, “verdict by lot” was listed as a ground for a new
trial in a criminal case. Law of April 20, 1850, ch. 11, § 472(4), 1850 Cal. Stat. 310 (“When the
verdict has been decided by lot, or by any means other than a fair expression of opinion on the
part of all the jurors.”); see also id. § 681(4) (same language). Note that the statute lists “verdict
by lot” in the same breath as other, vaguer means of deciding a verdict that depart from the “ideal
juror standard,” where juries fairly contemplate guilt based only on the facts before them. The
modern analog is CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West 2018).
188. More Bills, DAILY ALTA CAL., Feb. 11, 1862, at 1, https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=DAC18
620211&e=-------en--20--1--txt-txIN-------1. The bill in the same form may also have been intro-
duced on March 8 by Senator Rhodes during the later attempts to roll the bill back, although the
legislative write-up is unclear. See California Legislature Thirteenth Session, DAILY ALTA CAL.,
Mar. 8, 1862, at 1, https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=DAC18620308&e=-------en--20--1--txt-txIN------
-1 (referencing repeal of the amendment, but then offering the same language). The modern anal-
ogy is CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 657 (West 2018).
189. Senator O’Brien was quoted by a local paper:
Why, we passed the other day a law declaring that jury verdicts obtained by chance, null
and void, and that Law will affect causes now pending – Donner vs. Palmer, and some
others. I don’t profess to know much about law, but it seems to me that if this bill
becomes a law, it will be one of the best enacted this session. I hope it will pass.
Proceedings of the Assembly, DAILY EVENING BULL. (San Francisco, Cal.), Mar. 3, 1862, at 1,
http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6DPEo2 (emphasis added).
190. See Laws of California, Passed at the Thirteenth Session of the Legislature–1862, SAC-
RAMENTO DAILY UNION, Mar. 24, 1862, at 6, https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=SDU18620324&e=----
---en--20--1--txt-txIN-------1.
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caused a stir when the newspapers learned that its retroactivity was intended
to influence a specific case, Donner v. Palmer.191 The case was tried in
February of 1862, and several jurors flipped a coin to determine their votes
(a “partial chance verdict.”).192
The Donner case was the subject of enormous media attention in part
because of its subject. The plaintiff, Donner, was in fact the child of one of
the infamous Donner party, who was rescued from the mountains. When the
child arrived in San Francisco, the citizens of the city arranged for a transfer
of land to the boy.193 The grant, however, was tampered with, and thus
when the young Donner came of age, he filed an ejectment action to settle
title to the property.194 A more sympathetic plaintiff would have been hard
to come by, and this case illustrates the trend that chance verdicts occur
more frequently when cases are highly charged.
Once the amendment passed allowing for jurors to testify as to chance
verdicts, the legislature debated several attempts to roll the amendment
back.195 In the April 21, 1862 issue, the Daily Evening Bulletin could
hardly contain its disgust:
Senate bill to repeal the Act amendatory of the Practiced Act,
passed at this session, and which excited so much harsh comment
191. The Daily Evening Bulletin was particularly harsh in its critique:
In the Assembly, it was stated that the bill was designed to meet one particular case, viz:
The Donner suit lately finally decided in this city, and was rushed through the
Assembly by title only. It was characterized as an unwarrantable and dangerous
species of special legislation, which would not receive the sanction of the Legisla-
ture when its purport and object were exposed. Nevertheless, the resolution was
voted down. The only way now remaining to check what is believed to be a trick, if
not a gross fraud, will be for the Senate, where the matter seems to be understood,
to adopt a resolution asking the Governor to veto the Act.
What the Legislature Has Done To-Day, DAILY EVENING BULL. (San Francisco, Cal.), Mar. 3,
1862, at 2, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6DPNx1 (emphasis added). The next day, March
4, the paper issued something of a retraction, noting that it had incorrectly attributed the “unwar-
rantable and dangerous species of special legislation” language to a legislator; the litigation bill
itself received its own front-page byline. See The Donner vs. Palmer Special Legislation, DAILY
EVENING BULL. (San Francisco, Cal.), Mar. 4, 1862, at 1, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/
6DP5J3. The paper was quick to qualify that those words “expressed clearly our own opinion.” Id.
“[A]lthough in private conversations almost of a public character, this successful covert effort to
change our jury system to suit a particular case, was not only characterized as ‘unwarrantable and
dangerous,’ but infamous.” Id. The paper then published the statute in its entirety with the relevant
new “resort to the determination of chance” language bracketed so its readers could see exactly
what had been inserted. Id.
192. The “Donner Case” again–A Romance of the Mountains, DAILY EVENING BULL. (San
Francisco, Cal.), Mar. 25, 1864, at 5, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6DPFW5 (referencing as
grounds for a new trial that “one of the jurors confessed to having raffled for a verdict”) (emphasis
added). The paper framed the issue as one of criminal liability—the juror confessed to gambling in
lieu of performing his civic duty.
193. See generally id.
194. Id.
195. Legislative Doings, DAILY EVENING BULL. (San Francisco, Cal.), Apr. 21, 1864, at 1,
http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6DP5V9.
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as having been muggled through196 for the purpose of re-opening
the celebrated case of Donner vs. Palmer came up at a late hour
and excited a lengthy discussion. It will be remembered that the
obnoxious Act was construed to authorize the verdict of a jury to
be set aside on the affidavit of a single juryman, that he had gam-
bled with himself in a corner, as to his verdict. Not only would
this open up a temptation to the grossest frauds, but it is generally
believed that the sole object of the Act was to re-open [sic] the
Donner case, which had otherwise been finally settled.197
The newspaper’s impression that opening up the jury room amounted to
opening a Pandora’s Box would be echoed by later generations of judges.
But importantly, the newspaper was in the corner of the sympathetic party.
Its legal stance was the “popular” one. This is another observable trend in
the history of chance verdicts, and the legislative interference made the
story all the more outrageous.
Several days later, the Sacramento Daily Union printed some of the
legislative debate conducted over a repeal bill. Although the Senators dis-
claimed any intention of trying to directly impact the Donner case, the de-
bate is revealing for its discussion of how society should deal with chance
verdicts:
Misconduct of Jurors . . .
Mr. SHAFTER took occasion to reply to certain charges made
by the papers of San Francisco against him, for endeavoring
to smuggle through a bill of the same character in the early
part of the session, with a view to settling a case in which his
client was deeply interested in his favor. He had nothing to
do with it whatever, and did not vote for it . . . .
Mr. RHODES said he had no idea that the Senator from San
Francisco was guilty of trying to smuggle through any bill,
and testified that that was not his way of doing things. The
evil of gambling openly in juries was not half so bad as de-
stroying the effect of a verdict by the pretension of some
packed juryman to have been gambling secretly. Honest ju-
rymen gambled openly in the jury room, while all villains
would pretend to have gambled secretly. . . .
Mr. OULTON said it seemed to be agreed that a verdict ob-
tained by chance was one that ought not to stand. He could
see no injustice, hardship or danger in going upon the affida-
vit of a man who stated that he himself was the party whose
verdict was decided by a game of chance. It simply opened
196. The paper may have intended to use the word “smuggle” rather than “muggle.” The
“smuggle” language appears in a different article several days later. See Senate: Misconduct of
Jurors, SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, Apr. 23, 1862, at 4, https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=SDU18
620423&e=-------en--20--1--txt-txIN-------1.
197. Legislative Doings, DAILY EVENING BULL. (San Francisco, Cal.), Apr. 21, 1864, at 1,
http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6DP5V9.
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up the case for a new trial. That was not going to a danger-
ous extent.
Mr. VAN DYKE argued that they were going too far by taking
the affidavit of one as proof. He could see no harm in one
person gambling in a jury room where no other person knew
of it. Jurymen were often worn out and driven to such means
of deciding . . . .
Mr. PARKS expressed himself opposed to this bill, and hoped
it would be killed on engrossment. If he was found guilty of
any crime by chance, he would feel entitled to a new trial.
Mr. RHODES said he wished himself that no chance verdict
should stand, but it would open a door to a greater fraud. It
would be impossible in many cases to get the witnesses all
together again in his life.
Mr. PARKS said if such a man was on a jury in the first place,
it was enough that he should have a new trial before an hon-
est jury . . . .198
This debate captures perfectly the competing arguments and incentives
around admitting evidence to prove a chance verdict occurred. On the one
hand, any defendant found guilty by chance would rightly demand a new
trial where the evidence was considered. On the other hand, if a motion for
new trial based on a chance verdict could be used as a weapon by a clever
defense attorney (based on the testimony of one juror gambling privately),
that might undo the jury system. Whether prompted by sheer corruption on
the part of Senator Shafter or concern for the integrity of the jury system,
the statute promotes an ideal: jurors who deliberate fairly and sensibly. The
“resort” language—and the legislative debate—imply that chance verdicts
were seen as a form of surrender to temptation. The tenor of the senators’
comments also suggests that the legislators feared the public hearing too
much about what happened in the jury room.
The next day, April 23, 1862, the Daily Evening Bulletin printed an
editor bulletin signed “One Who Knows,” slamming Senator Shafter for his
ties to the firm representing the defendants in Donner v. Palmer.199 The
editorial is remarkable because it illustrates that newspapers at the time con-
sidered a chance verdict as the highest of drama. The legislative wrangling
made the issue even riper fodder for print sales. But the author’s position
was, in a sense, non-populist; that is, it argued for preserving the outcome
of a chance verdict. Later newspapers would argue just as vehemently on
behalf of defendants convicted by different forms of chance verdict, but
198. Senate: Misconduct of Jurors, supra note 196. This is the most extensive legislative his-
tory on a chance verdict. Van Dyke’s arguments in particular show that a partial chance verdict
was meant to be included in the statute.
199. Editor Bulletin, Something more of the Donner Case and Senator Shafter, DAILY EVE-
NING BULL. (San Francisco, Cal.), Apr. 23, 1864, at 2, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6DPR
T3 (emphasis added).
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their modus operandi was the same: assuming whatever legal argument bet-
ter served the more sympathetic party.
The controversy was not limited to the machinations of the California
Legislature. One of the jurors from the February 1862 trial, J.M. Good, was
so offended by the public discourse surrounding the verdict that he penned
a letter to the Daily Evening Bulletin disclaiming any part in the chance
verdict:
In your issue of yesterday a correspondent states that Mr. [Sena-
tor] Shafter is reputed to have said, in the Senate, that in the case
of Donner vs. Palmer et al. a verdict ‘had absolutely been decided
by the tossing of a copper.’ From this I am constrained to infer
that Mr. Shafter had not only charged the jury with gambling, but
given the public the opinion that the jury empaneled to try the
case were no better than a set of blacklegs, and had no regard for
the oaths under which they were acting.
As a juryman in that case I must plead ‘not guilty’ to the charge,
or implied charge, of Mr. Shafter, and not only call upon, but
demand that he shall place the jury in a proper light to the public.
If any unlawful act has been done by the jury or any members of
it, let Mr. Shafter mention the names of the parties, and not let an
insinuation go to the world, that all members composing that jury
are gamblers. As a juryman in that case I ask for justice at the
hands of Mr. Shafter.
J.M. GOOD200
His missive is significant because it shows that Good did not want to be
tarred with the same stigma that he felt the offending jurors deserved. For
Good, “giving in to chance” was a stain on a man’s reputation. His letter
speaks in several different modes: (a) a vice component, referencing gam-
bling as an undesirable activity; (b) a civic component, in terms of assuring
the public that he had not abdicated his duties as a civil servant; and (c) a
community component, where Good connotes his fellow jurors’ conduct as
a failure to afford a fellow citizen a fair hearing.
The stigma of a chance verdict may also explain the newspapers’ (per-
haps feigned) fury that the legislature had rushed through a bill on such a
significant topic. Of course, the sheer spectacle of the event could be behind
the emotional character of the coverage. The copy writes itself: “A boy,
victim of the tragedy of a murderous migration, is welcomed to his new
metropolis by generous citizens. He lays claim to the land set aside for his
benefit, and the trial is corrupted by yet more barbarism as the jurors ‘raf-
200. J.M. Good, Editor Bulletin, A Juror in the Donner Case Upon the Late Verdict, DAILY
EVENING BULL. (San Francisco, Cal.), Apr. 24, 1864, at 2, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/
6DP6WX (emphasis in original). “Blackleg” is defined as “one who cheats at cards, especially a
professional gambler; cardsharp.” Blackleg, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1981). The language is
significant because it not only connotes someone as a gambler, but a cheating gambler at that.
This “double-vice” terminology showcases the contempt people felt for chance verdicts.
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fle’201 off his rights. Then the Legislature, motivated by one senator’s
greed, monkeys with the statute to undo the verdict.” Chance verdicts are
sensational because they shock the conscience; they invite us to question
the very integrity of the jury system generally. Why should we trust juries
with our fates when they cannot be trusted to even give defendants a fair
hearing? Of course, the newspapers in 1862 adopted the perspective that the
exact outrage that its readers should be concerned with was in fact the re-
versal of a chance verdict; in other words, the newspapers’ sympathies lay
with the plaintiff, Donner. As this paper seeks to show through this history,
chance verdicts are certainly a rarity, but they are a recurring rarity.
By the time Donner vs. Palmer reached the California Supreme Court
in the July term of 1863, the parties had had months to brief their positions
on the new statute.202 The California Supreme Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Crocker, held that the statute applied to motions for new trial submitted
after the statute’s passage203 and that, thus, the defendant was entitled to a
new trial.204 The court’s opinion also included the sordid details of what
transpired in the jury room at trial. Ironically, one of the offending jurors
was named Fortune. The two flipped a coin to decide which group they
would join.205
Several important points in the above rendition merit discussion. First,
there was pressure on the jury generally to act in favor of a plaintiff that
was likely generally well known to the public. Second, there was pressure
on these two men as the sole dissenters in the case. Third, the California
Supreme Court recited these facts without commentary. Absent is the lan-
guage of contempt and scorn that most courts adopt when dealing with
these verdicts. The court delivered its judgment soberly and procedurally.
For Fortune and Heller, resorting to a statistical method was enough in the
heat of the moment to relinquish their views. Upon being approached after
201. The “raffle” language is the Daily Evening Bulletin’s, but the rest is my own. See The
“Donner Case” again–A Romance of the Mountains, supra note 192 (referencing as grounds for a
new trial that “one of the jurors confessed to having raffled for a verdict”).
202. Donner v. Palmer, 23 Cal. 40, 47 (1863).
203. The court’s procedural wrangling is important because it demonstrates the granular level
of detail that the court felt was necessary in arriving at an unpopular outcome:
The statute related merely to the remedy, declaring the rule of evidence to govern the
Courts in hearing and determining motions for new trials, founded upon alleged miscon-
duct of the jury, and it clearly applies to all motions for new trials heard after it took
effect. . . . If that judgment was entered upon a verdict rendered under circumstances
showing misconduct on the part of the jury, the law in existence at the time of the trial,
verdict, and judgment, gave the defendants a right to have the judgment vacated and a
new trial granted . . . .
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 48 (“That the conduct of these jurors was such as to vitiate the verdict there can be
no doubt. The rule of law upon this subject is well settled. . . . The judgment is reversed and a new
trial ordered as to the defendants and the intervenor.”).
205. Id. at 47.
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the fact, the two men refused to testify as to their conduct.206 The dispute
over the land itself would not end until 1870.207
B. “The Most Accurate of the Sciences”: Changing Perspectives in the
Turner Case
The Donner case was just the beginning of the California judiciary’s
attempts to apply the new statute to different forms of chance verdict. Two
cases, both decided a year after Donner in the July term of 1864, demon-
strate the ensuing confusion surrounding chance and quotient verdicts. Iron-
ically, the judge who wrote the opinion for both cases, Chief Judge
Sanderson, was chosen as chief judge by the drawing of lots,208 and in fact
served on the court with a brother of the Senator Shafter who shepherded
the statute through the legislature.209 The key question was whether quo-
tient verdicts should rank as offensive with full and partial chance verdicts.
This distinction is crucial because, on the one hand, a quotient verdict jury
departs from the realm of reasoned, collaborative decision-making, but on
the other hand, quotients seem less offensive than full chance verdicts.
The first case, Turner, concerned excess flow from a ditch.210 Justice
Sanderson assumed for the purposes of the decision that the case had been
rendered as a full quotient verdict (the more specious kind) rather than a
working quotient verdict.211 The crux of the problem with a quotient verdict
was the agreement in advance to be bound; a “working quotient verdict,”
conversely, was allowable.212 A quotient verdict driven by an agreement to
be bound in advance (without further tinkering with the resulting quotient)
was “vicious and irregular.”213 The remainder of the opinion is remarkable
for the criticisms it heaps on the legislature and for the outcome of the case.
Discussing the statute of 1862, Justice Sanderson did not hold back as he
criticized the statute.214 In other words, Sanderson questioned why the leg-
islature had elevated some forms of misconduct while choosing not to speak
on others; it is difficult to assess whether he was taking a veiled shot at
206. Apparently, the defendants approached the two to no avail. Id. at 48.
207. Donner v. Palmer, No. 751, 1870 WL 582 (Cal. July 29, 1870), later codified as Donner
v. Palmer, 51 Cal. 629 (1877). The Reporter’s Note at the end of the 1877 opinion indicates that
the case was chosen in 1877 for inclusion in the California Reports series.
208. The Supreme Court, S.F. CALL, June 22, 1895, at 5, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/
lccn/sn85066387/1895-06-22/ed-1/seq-5.
209. The connection was not lost on the newspapers of the time. See When Thieves Fall Out,
Etc., PLACER HERALD (Rocklin, Cal.), Dec. 19, 1863, at 2, https://www.newspapers.com/image/
385673848/?terms=shafter+supreme+court+brother; see also Congressional, SANTA CRUZ SENTI-
NEL, July 23, 1864, at 2, https://www.newspapers.com/image/55449547/?terms=shafter+supreme+
court+brother.
210. Turner v. Tuolumne Cty. Water Co., 25 Cal. 397 (1864).
211. Id. at 399.
212. Id. at 399–400.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 400–01.
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Senator Shafter’s statute for being “selective” in order to achieve profitabil-
ity for its author. Though the assumed full quotient verdict was “undoubt-
edly vicious, and ought to be set aside,”215 the only question for the court
was whether juror affidavits could be admitted to prove the misconduct.
After reviewing several key precedential cases,216 the court took an ex-
traordinary turn away from the logic of the precedent it cited and held that
full quotient verdicts did not employ chance:
Neither is the aggregate of these sums, nor the quotient resulting
from a division of the aggregate by twelve, the result of chance,
but, on the contrary, the result of the most accurate of the sci-
ences. Thus from the commencement to the end of the process no
quantity which enters into the final result is determined by a re-
sort to chance.217
In other words, the Sanderson court rejected not only the applicability of the
statute to the instant case but additionally the applicability of a case, Wilson
v. Berryman, decided by the same court not even ten years prior.218 Indeed,
the court’s discussion of mathematics as self-evidently ensuring fairness
brings to mind the statistical fairness of a coin flip itself. This dispute—
whether quotient verdicts share the problems of chance verdicts—is the
bedrock of what makes chance verdicts so contentious.
The second case, Boyce, a horrific stagecoach liability suit involving a
quotient verdict, should be understood as the logical outgrowth of the knot
that the court tied for itself in Turner.219 The question similarly was
whether quotient verdicts shared the offensive characteristics of chance ver-
dicts. The litigators were well aware of the passion churned up by chance
verdicts and sought to prove that quotient verdicts were just as bad as
chance verdicts in their arguments.220 The first time the case was heard,
Chief Justice Sanderson devoted a paragraph to the chance verdict issue.221
He noted that each juror had marked down his preferred damages figure on
a slip of paper, added them together, and divided by twelve to arrive at a
figure that the jury had previously agreed to adopt. Calling the method “vi-
cious,” he went on to state that because there was no evidence of the com-
putation aside from evidence submitted by the jury, it was as though the
215. Id. at 400.
216. Importantly, the court quoted Wilson’s language noting that a quotient verdict shared the
same evils as a full chance verdict. Turner, 25 Cal. at 402 (quoting Wilson v. Berryman, 5 Cal. 44,
45–46 (1855)).
217. Turner, 25 Cal. at 402–03 (deciding not to admit the affidavits).
218. 5 Cal. 44 (1855).
219. Boyce v. California Stage Co., 25 Cal. 460 (1864).
220. See id. at 464–65 (counsellor Filkins’s argument on the petition for rehearing). Filkins
argued that the verdict was “vicious and void,” and his argument painted chance verdicts and
quotient verdicts as peas in a pod. Id. Filkins used the language of sin and public order in his
argument. He even cited Donna v. Palmer in his earlier papers. See id. at 461 (argument before
petition for rehearing).
221. Id. at 473.
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verdict was completely intact.222 Citing Turner, he again held that quotient
verdicts did not fit within the meaning of the new chance verdict statute.
On rehearing (codified within the same reported opinion), Justice San-
derson spilled a great deal of ink addressing the chance verdict issue. The
“better rule,” he said, was that affidavits of jurors could not be received to
impeach a verdict.223 Noting that the 1862 statute had “superseded” the
common law by creating exceptions to it, he then took the case out of the
statute’s bailiwick.224 His opinion demonstrates that judges were afraid of
construing the chance verdict statute too broadly.225 Sanderson then recited
the history of the statute,226 noting that it had been prompted by Donner v.
Palmer. Calling Donner “a clear case of chance,” he noted that the Legisla-
ture had “legitimate[ly] reference[d]” the case in passing the statute.227 The
injustice of that case was so grave, in other words, that the legislature’s
intervention was rightful. There was no mention of the act’s troubled his-
tory, or that Sanderson was serving with a family member of a man who
was allegedly instrumental in the act’s passage. This tug of war over
whether quotient verdicts were on the “bad side” of the jury misconduct
line would rage for decades, and it adds a legal dimension to the human
interest stories explored earlier.
Boyce illustrates that, for Justice Sanderson, the public shame from a
full chance verdict was so great that the law had to yield; the court in Boyce
viewed the change in the law as rightful, even though it refused to apply the
change to a quotient verdict. The opinion also shows that the judicial reac-
tion to the act was one of fear. Holding the common law rule as cardinal,
the court in Boyce and Turner narrowly construed the inquiry, even as they
criticized quotient verdicts as “vicious” and noted that they shared some of
the same problems as “clear” chance verdicts. Taken together, Boyce and
Turner signaled that: (1) lawyers in the community had gotten the message
that the statute could be used offensively even when a quotient verdict,
rather than a chance verdict, had transpired; (2) judges were fearful that the
legislature’s meddling had created an opening in the common law rule of no
impeachment; and (3) those judges were willing to jump over (even after
citing) precedent like Wilson v. Berryman in rushing to protect the common
law rule. The distinction between chance verdicts and quotient verdicts was
most disputed when the judges felt the common law rule was under threat.
To save the common law, courts began to disregard components of it that
did not suit their purposes. Justice Sanderson may also have been trying to
222. Id.
223. Boyce, 25 Cal. at 474.
224. Id. at 475.
225. See id. at 476.
226. Again, using moralistic language, Justice Sanderson notes that he was reviewing the leg-
islative history to “ascertain” the precise “evil” that the Legislature had “in view, and for which
they sought to provide a remedy.” Id.
227. Id. at 477.
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send a message to the legislature that if they wished to override a common
law rule, they had to do so with sweeping clarity.
Over the next decades, the California courts continued to zigzag be-
tween holding that quotient verdicts fell under the umbrella of chance ver-
dicts and, conversely, that they did not. Lawyers clearly continued to
attempt to use the statute offensively when verdicts were rendered in the
other side’s favor.228 In at least one case, the lawyers succeeded. In Levy v.
Brannan, a partial quotient verdict case, the reporter reprinted the respon-
dent’s brief, which argued that because the entire jury had not used a quo-
tient method, the verdict was valid.229 In a one paragraph order, the court
ordered a new trial with no mention of Boyce and Turner.230 Perhaps the
court felt that this case came closer to a partial chance verdict than a partial
quotient verdict, but the opinion makes no mention of the distinction. In any
case, the lack of distinction likely incentivized attorneys to continue includ-
ing chance verdict allegations in their motions for new trial. By 1888, the
California Supreme Court was back onto the Turner and Boyce line of case
law construing quotient verdicts in all their forms as outside the statute.231
The confusion reached a head when the court decided Marriner v.
Dennison.232 This case, perhaps more than the others in the period between
1864 and 1893, demonstrates why quotient verdicts share the problematic
features of chance verdicts, even if the court did not always perceive it this
way. Evidently, the jury voted to see where they “stood”; eight voted for the
plaintiff and four for the defendant.233 One juror suggested a quotient
method be used, and a majority of the jury voted to approve that “mo-
tion.”234 In this case, one juror threw the average off by inserting a very
228. Perhaps this offensive use of the statute substantiates Justice Sanderson’s probable fear
that the statute would be misused if it were construed too broadly. See Hoare v. Hindley, 49 Cal.
274 (1874). In Hoare, a full quotient verdict case, the reported opinion relates the language used
in the affidavit testifying to the misconduct. Id. at 275–76. The affidavit was the defendant’s, and
it used the precise word in the statute: “resorted.” Id. at 276. This implies that the defendant’s
attorney, searching for ways to overturn a verdict unfavorable to his client, lifted the statute’s
language and put it in his client’s affidavit. The California Supreme Court was not impressed, and
simply deferred to the trial court’s resolution of the conflicting evidence. Id. at 277 (“We do not
feel authorized to set it aside.”).
229. Levy v. Brannan, 39 Cal. 485, 487–88 (1870). Their argument would seem to fly directly
in the face of Donner, a partial chance verdict case where two members of the jury corrupted the
whole proceeding. Donner v. Palmer, 23 Cal. 40 (1863).
230. Id. at 489 (setting aside the verdict for the “misconduct” of “drawing lots”).
231. This is demonstrated by Hunt v. Elliott, 20 P. 132, 133 (Cal. 1888), a working quotient
verdict case where the court cited Turner and Hoare.
232. 27 P. 927 (Cal. 1891), modified on reh’g, 27 P. 1091 (Cal. 1891).
233. Id. at 559.
234. The court described the process:
Some voted for the defendant, one voted $1, others, various amounts, and one voted
$10,000. The amounts voted were all added together, and divided by twelve, which
made $2,600. One member of the jury then moved that $100 be knocked off, making the
amount $2,500, which was carried by a majority of the jury, and they then returned that
amount to the court as their verdict.
Id.
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high number into the proceedings, but arguably the juror who wrote $1 did
precisely the same thing on the low end.235 As the court noted, the plaintiff
had only requested damages in the amount of $3,500.236 The court went on
to declare that the verdict was “undoubtedly vicious and ought to be set
aside,” but, after citing Turner and Hunt, stated that the affidavits could not
be received to show a chance verdict.237
The court in Marriner granted a new trial based on the plaintiff’s fail-
ure to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he had been dam-
aged.238 But the court’s logical progression on the quotient verdict issue is
sweeping. In the same breath, the court said: (a) the verdict, more specifi-
cally the quotient verdict method, was vicious; (b) the juror affidavits testi-
fying as to the misconduct were credible; (c) the Turner case line prevented
the affidavits from fitting under the chance verdict statute; and (d) granting
a new trial on other grounds. The quotient verdict issue no doubt influenced
the granting of the motion for new trial. The fact that one juror suggested
knocking $100 off the verdict—and the fact that the jurors in the minority
did not dispute entering a verdict for $2,500 when presumably they be-
lieved the plaintiff was not entitled to anything—displays the rough and
tumble of jurors deliberating baldly. It suggests the jury cared only about
the verdict “appearing” reasonable than giving the parties a fair shot. Evi-
dently, the California Supreme Court was not pleased with this “seeing how
the sausage is made” fact pattern, because a month after issuing the opinion,
the court struck the chance verdict discussion from its own record.239 This
action suggests that the court feared the case’s future application as
precedent.
C. “They Had as Well Determine Their Own Rights by Drawing Lots”:
Dixon to Mirabito II
In 1893, the court attempted to end the confusion, and recalibrated its
posture on quotient verdicts. In Dixon v. Pluns, the court overruled the Tur-
ner case line, and again squarely asked whether quotient verdicts fit the
meaning of chance verdicts as contemplated by the statute.240 Seizing on
Justice Sanderson’s admonition in Turner that quotient verdicts were “vi-
cious and irregular,” the Dixon court reasoned that “[i]f this character of
verdict is vicious and irregular, it can only be vicious and irregular upon the




238. Marriner, 27 P. at 928.
239. Marriner v. Dennison, 27 P. 1091, 1091 (Cal. 1891) (“The opinion heretofore filed in the
above-entitled cause is hereby modified by striking therefrom that portion which is included under
the subdivisions numbered, respectively, 2 and 3.”).
240. 33 P. 268, 269 (Cal. 1893).
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jurors contemplated by the law, but that it was arrived at by a resort to
chance or lot.”241 Dixon represents the beginning of a transition,242 whereby
the court began to discuss and elevate a new ideal of jurors as the calm
arbiters of facts. Gone in the Dixon opinion is any discussion or implied
fear of assertive defense attorneys seeking to undo an unfavorable verdict.
Instead, the Dixon court attempted to define “chance” itself, decided that
quotient verdicts were as bad as full chance verdicts, and overturned Turner
and its progeny.243
The distinction made by the Dixon court is subtle but profound. The
court engineered an explicit decisional course correction that brings quo-
tient verdicts under the chance verdict umbrella by spelling out precisely
why a quotient verdict shares the offensive characteristics of a chance ver-
dict. Jurors agreeing to be bound surrender their autonomy. Averaging may
seem fair, but it often performs the same insidious, penetrative function as a
coin. In the main, someone is inserting their prejudice (be it bias for one
party via a higher damages figure, a lack of interest in their civic duty via a
coin toss, or racial animus) into a figure or a decision that cannot be evalu-
ated by other jurors. This “prejudice perspective” contrasts with the “mathe-
241. Id. at 386 (citing Turner v. Tuolumne Cty. Water Co., 25 Cal. 397 (1864).
242. The California Supreme Court may have drawn inspiration from its sister courts in the
West. Earlier in 1893, Idaho, which had adopted the chance verdict statute directly from Califor-
nia, considered the Turner case line and held that it was misguided. See Flood v. McClure, 32 P.
254, 255 (Idaho 1893). Considering a full quotient verdict, the Idaho Supreme Court opined:
The clear intent of the law is that the verdict shall be the result of intelligent discussion,
deliberation, and conviction by and of the jury, and we think the method used comes
clearly within the provision of subdivision 2, § 4439, Rev. St., and that the affidavit of a
juror is competent to prove the same. If the rights of litigants are to be determined by
juries by such methods, they had as well determine their own rights by drawing lots or
tossing up a piece of money, and not pretend to submit their cases to juries for their
careful deliberation, and for the result of their best judgment.
Id. at 256 (emphasis added). The Dixon court noticed this logic and cited Flood with approval.
Dixon, 33 P. at 269. Thus, it might be said that the Idaho Supreme Court began the transition to
”rights-based” language, and that the California Supreme Court followed suit. See generally Wat-
son v. Navistar Transp. Corp., 927 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1992) (showing the Idaho Supreme Court at
the forefront of assessing chance verdicts even into the late twentieth century). The Flood case
proved influential in its own era; later Idaho courts cited it as guiding precedent even when the
facts did not perfectly match. See McDonald v. Great N. Ry. Co., 46 P. 766, 767 (Idaho 1896)
(“While the facts disclosed by the record do not bring this case strictly within the letter of the
decision in the case of [Flood v. McClure], we think it is clearly within the spirit of that deci-
sion.”). Flood was also cited in a Montana quotient verdict case. Gordon v. Trevarthan, 34 P. 185,
187 (Mont. 1893). The Gordon court also noted that the Turner case line had endured heavy
criticism in treatises and cases. Id. at 186–87.
243. The court said:
“Chance” may be defined to be hazard, risk, or the result or issue of uncertain and
unknown conditions or forces, and the facts here developed bring the case clearly within
such definition. . . . In the casting of a die or the tossing of a coin justice has an equal
chance with injustice, but under the system here considered [quotient verdict], one un-
scrupulous and cunning juror always has the power to defeat justice by increasing or
decreasing the amount of the verdict in proportion as he places his estimate at an uncon-
scionably high or low figure.
Dixon, 33 P. at 269 (emphasis added).
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matical approach” employed by earlier California supreme courts. The
zigzagging by the court during this era as to whether chance verdicts en-
compassed quotient verdicts suggests that it is best to be flexible when as-
sessing a quotient verdict that shares characteristics of a chance verdict.
Even as the Dixon court tried to resolve matters, later courts returned
to the same logical fault lines. In one case, the court accepted the gloss
placed on the verdict by counteraffidavits to conclude that the verdict was a
working quotient verdict rather than a full quotient verdict.244 In another
case discussing outside influences on the jury, the court expressed its fears
about opening and reopening jury verdicts to inquiry.245
Thirty years later, a San Francisco jury invented a new method of ar-
riving at a damages figure that would further challenge jurists.246 In the
Mirabito case, the jurors could not agree upon a damages figure. So, they
agreed to vote on two different damage figures ($5,000 and $2,000), and
agreed that whichever figure received more votes would be the unanimous
verdict of all jurors.247 The California Court of Appeals reversed, speaking
in the same voice as Dixon and emphasizing that “the parties to a civil
action are entitled to a verdict of nine jurors arrived at by considering the
evidence and exercising their judgments.”248 The problem, as discussed in
Dixon, was the agreement to be bound beforehand.249 The court’s language
completes the shift from the language of order and religiosity (the sin of
gambling) in the 1850s and 1860s to a litigant-focused, rights-perspective
approach begun by Dixon. But in yet another twist, the California Supreme
Court took up the case and reversed the appellate court.250
244. McDonnell v. Pescadero & San Mateo Stage Co., 52 P. 725, 726 (Cal. 1898) (“The
counter affidavits, however, put an entirely different phase on the matter, and show that the ballot-
ing to arrive at an average was not to control the minds of the jury nor to forestall their ultimate
conclusion; it was merely a basis from which to work in their effort to reach a verdict, and the
method adopted did not violate the statute.”). Counter affidavits can present a vexing problem to
courts trying to assess whether a chance verdict even occurred. See, e.g., Beakley v. Optimist
Printing Co., 152 P. 212, 215 (Idaho 1915) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
245. People v. Azoff, 39 P. 59, 60 (Cal. 1895) (“Indeed, it would be difficult to place a limit to
the corruption such a practice might engender.”).
246. Mirabito v. S.F. Dairy Co., 27 P.2d 106, 106–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 107–08. The Court said:
Whenever the jurors agree beforehand to abide by the unknown . . . it is likewise a
resort to chance depriving the parties of a verdict which can be said to be the verdict of
nine of their number arrived at by the exercise of the judgment of said jurors. In such
cases the jurors wrongfully agree beforehand to forego their independent judgments and
to hazard their individual verdicts upon conditions which are then unknown and
uncertain.
Id. (emphasis added).
250. Mirabito v. S.F. Dairy Co., 35 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1934).
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The supreme court reasoned that the verdict was inoffensive because
the two damage figures were known to the jury.251 While the court accepted
the Dixon definition of “chance,” it denied that Dixon’s logic controlled:
To our minds there was no operation of any unknown force or
unexplainable cause but an exercise of the judgment of each juror.
Each juror by an act of conscious volition participated in the de-
termination of the amount of the verdict even though he may have
reached his decision by other methods than by weighing the evi-
dence and may have based his judgment upon considerations
other than his own opinion of the proper amount of damages to be
awarded. The agreement which appellants attempted to show was
not an agreement to resort to the determination of chance.252
Mirabito II, in distinguishing Dixon, created a new, inoffensive category of
quotient verdict: a quotient verdict where the options are known to the vot-
ing jurors. In this sense, there is no chance of an interloping juror inserting
an unreasonably high figure into the proceeding. Conversely, there is still
an element of the unknown as between options A and B. The California
Supreme Court seems to be suggesting that compromise as a juror is desira-
ble, understandable, and necessary. Because there is no mysterious force at
work, the concerns surrounding a chance verdict fall away. Despite the su-
preme court’s assurance that this jury was above board, the line here is
incredibly difficult to police. The appeals court thought that there was a
rights problem here, whereas the supreme court’s understanding of the role
of jurors is far more transactional and negotiation-based. An ideal jury for
the appeals court exercises good independent judgment, while an ideal jury
for the supreme court conducts a give and take that will remain undisturbed
absent some penetrative, unknown force.
In the ensuing decades, chance verdicts retreated somewhat from the
pages of the California reports. In 1969, the California Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the rule that jurors could testify as to objective facts to uncover
misconduct and cited the history of the 1862 statute as proof that the root of
the rule was not solely statutory.253 It is important to note that simply be-
cause a gap in the case law exists as to chance verdicts, that does not mean
that they have not occurred. On the contrary, the shame that attaches to a
juror accused of involvement with a chance verdict diminishes the chances
that they will be reported or discovered.
251. Id. at 404.
252. Id.
253. People v. Hutchinson, 445 P.2d 132, 135–36 (Cal. 1969). See also Tillery v. Richland,
158 Cal. App. 3d 957, 973 (1984) (referencing the statute’s history).
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D. “The Right to a Verdict Based on the Evidence and Not a Coin Flip
is Clearly Established in Law, Though Hardly Ever Vindicated
in Practice”: The Long Journey of Mr. Reyes
The last chapter of the California story is troubling and demonstrates
the need for additional clarity in the small but contentious arena of chance
verdicts. For the purposes of this particular entry in the California saga, this
paper will depart from the position of historical observer and adopt a posi-
tion on the case law. In 1994, a man named Isidro Reyes was arrested and
later convicted for possession of cocaine for sale.254 During the delibera-
tions, the lone holdout on the jury flipped a coin privately and later testified
to doing so.255 On direct appeal and on collateral review, Reyes argued that
this partial chance verdict should have afforded him a new trial. He was
right. Simply, four courts—the California state trial court, the California
Court of Appeal, the Magistrate Judge in the Central District of California,
and two justices of the Ninth Circuit—misinterpreted the case law and de-
nied Reyes a new trial. Partial and full chance verdicts (and arguably certain
quotient verdicts) undermine the rule of law, and the flip of a coin has no
place in a jury room whatsoever.
The facts of the case present a classic partial chance verdict. The jury
was in its final day of deliberations, and two jurors remained unconvinced
of the defendant’s guilt. One of the two switched sides, and the final juror,
Shakeed F., felt pressured to vote to return a guilty verdict. He suggested
that the jury inform the judge that they were hung, eleven-to-one. The
eleven jurors requested that Shakeed listen to their thoughts. During the
lunch hour, he flipped a coin in his car as a “corporate decision” that was
not “biased.”256 After lunch, the jury spent an hour and half in the room
before declaring Reyes guilty.257 That hour and a half became crucial in
later commentary on whether Shakeed’s coin flip was problematic. Upon
being asked at a posttrial hearing what occurred during that hour and a half,
Shakeed (later called Juror F, or “Mr. Fareed” in the federal decisions) testi-
fied that “[w]e were in there, but the decision was made. The decision was
practically made before we even went to lunch.”258 The prosecution argued
posttrial that this hour and a half was dispositive because it demonstrated
254. All of the facts of the Reyes case were assembled from three opinions. The first is the
state court appellate decision. See The People v. Isidro Samuel Reyes, No. B106911 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Reyes Appellate Decision]. The second is a Magistrate Judge’s
Amended Report and Recommendation on Reyes’ habeas claim. Amended Report and Recom-
mendation, Reyes v. Seifert, No. 2:01-cv-08666-PA-MAN (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2003) (No. 16)
[hereinafter Reyes Magistrate Decision]. The third is the Ninth Circuit’s decision on Reyes’
habeas claim. Reyes v. Seifert, 125 F. App’x 788 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the California Court of
Appeals decision is unreported, it is appended as Appendix C.
255. Reyes Appellate Decision, supra note 254, at 3.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Reyes Magistrate Decision, supra note 254, at 24 n.9.
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that the jury continued substantive deliberations after the coin flip, which
was “a rationalization for [Mr. Shakeed’s] succumbing to the pressure.”259
The trial court denied Reyes’s motion for new trial and accepted that
the coin flip occurred, but refused to inquire into the juror’s subjective
mental processes.260 The California Court of Appeal conducted a statutory
analysis based on CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 657(2) and CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1181(4).261 The court reviewed some of the precedent discussed above,
and concluded that:
Here, appellant contends there was a chance verdict because one
juror, Mr. Shakeed F., tossed a coin. By focusing on this lan-
guage, however, appellant misses the mark and demonstrates a
misunderstanding of the basic premise of a “chance verdict” or a
“verdict by lot.” Such verdicts result from the jury’s agreement in
advance to be bound by a result reached by a methodology which
resorts to chance. . . . A verdict by chance or lot does not refer to
the mental processes of one juror, in isolation from his or her
fellow jurors. If the jury panel uses some tool, such as a coin, the
roll of a dice, or a mathematical formula, to assist it in reaching a
conclusion, but there was no antecedent agreement to use that re-
sult as the verdict, there is no impropriety. If there is no antece-
dent agreement, the verdict was not a “verdict by chance or
lot.”262
The court further noted that the jury continued to deliberate for an hour and
a half after the flip.263
The appellate court’s logic is flawed for several reasons. First, the pre-
mise underlying the decision—that the jury deliberated for an hour after the
coin flip—is contradicted by the juror-in-question’s testimony, which stated
clearly that even though the jury was in the room after lunch, the coin flip
influenced the decision. His very act of coming forward indicates that the
coin flip was essential to his decision and that he felt guilty about the way it
happened. Second, the court cited Dixon for its definition of chance and
then failed to acknowledge that Dixon itself was a partial chance verdict
where at least a modicum of deliberation occurred after the alleged flip.
Third, the fact that one juror resorted to a chance method has never been an
obstacle to receiving evidence of a chance verdict—in fact, in the quotient
verdict context, the one juror who inserts an unreasonably high or low fig-
ure into the quotient is the one corrupting the proceeding. The legislative
history of the act also suggests that it was written to broadly encompass
misconduct by even a single juror. The problem here is the intrusion of
259. Reyes Appellate Decision, supra note 254, at 4.
260. Id. at 5.
261. Id. at 5–7. Importantly, the court noted that there was no difference between the two
statutes. Id. at 8–9.
262. Id. at 9–10 (emphasis in original).
263. Id. at 10–11.
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chance into the sanctum of the jury room. Thus, as a matter of state law, the
court erred by failing to properly appreciate the meaning of the statute as
codified in later years.
Reyes fared no better on habeas review. Although the magistrate judge
prefaced her analysis by noting that criminal defendants are entitled to im-
partial and competent jurors who base their verdict on the evidence devel-
oped at trial, she concluded that the coin toss was simply part and parcel of
the juror’s internal mental deliberations to make a decision.264 Given that
the case had assumed a collateral posture, the magistrate judge narrowed the
inquiry to assessing “solely whether the state courts’ decision that juror F.’s
actions did not violate petitioner’s constitutional rights is contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as established
by the United States Supreme Court.”265 The court concluded that no
United States Supreme Court authority compelled the opposite result. As
this paper argues elsewhere, a chance verdict should qualify under general
principles of due process as one of the grave and extraordinary circum-
stances where the strictures of the Federal Rules of Evidence should fall
away to prevent a manifest injustice. The magistrate concluded on that sub-
ject that even if California’s chance verdict statutes created a liberty interest
under the due process clause, the state court’s conclusion that the verdict
did not fit into the statute was logical.266 “The jurors in Donner agreed to
abide by the coin toss and considered themselves bound by the agreement.
Thus, Donner does not support a conclusion that petitioner was convicted
based on a ‘chance verdict’ under California law.”267 The history of Cali-
fornia chance verdicts decidedly shows that it is the injection of chance into
a verdict—by one juror or more—that corrupts a proceeding. While the
statute certainly condemns “full chance verdicts,” the history and the statute
can be fairly read to encompass partial chance verdicts and certain forms of
quotient verdict. By narrowly construing the history of California chance
verdicts as a mere expression of agreements to abide in advance by a
264. Reyes Magistrate Decision, supra note 254, at 14–16. It should be said at the outset that
the Magistrate Judge’s simple statement (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants
a verdict by impartial and competent jurors. . . . [T]he jury’s verdict must be based upon the
evidence developed at trial.” Id. at 14) should resolve the issue of a chance verdict in any form.
The Magistrate Judge also noted that a defendant is entitled to twelve impartial jurors. Id. at 15
(emphasis added). Interestingly, the District Judge hesitated in adopting the Magistrate’s opinions
on the chance verdict wholesale and certified the issue for appeal. See Reyes v. Seifert, No. CV-
01-08666-PA (MAN), 2003 WL 27382041, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2003) (“Additionally, the
Court believes that this claim raises significant issues regarding the constitutionality of a verdict
when one juror has resorted to a random means for determining guilt, and clarification of the law
on this issue may be warranted.”).
265. Reyes Magistrate Decision, supra note 254, at 16.
266. Id. at 20–21.
267. Id. at 21–22. As a factual matter, the Donner opinion stated: “[T]hey [the offending
jurors] announced that he had guessed right, and they thereupon agreed to a verdict for the plain-
tiff, but both said it was still contrary to their convictions.” Donner v. Palmer, 23 Cal. 40, 47
(1863). There is no indication in the opinion of how long this process actually took.
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chance method—as opposed to the spirit of the statutes and the case law—
the magistrate judge erred.
The case’s outcome at the federal appellate level demonstrates the con-
tentiousness that chance verdicts still inspire. Circuit Judge Clifton and Dis-
trict Judge Weiner (sitting by designation) held in a brief opinion that “[n]o
Supreme Court authority holds that a defendant has a constitutional right to
a new trial when an individual juror bases his decision to vote guilty on an
irrational method, such as a coin toss.”268 Circuit Judge Reinhardt dis-
sented, noting that chance verdicts posed unique due process problems and
opining that “[a] defendant is entitled to such relief whether a taint impli-
cates the entire jury or whether only one juror commits the unconstitutional
act.”269 Judge Reinhardt also discussed the admissibility problem and sug-
gested that the California statute had been designed with this express issue
in mind.270 The Reyes case demonstrates that although chance verdicts are
rarely discovered, the questions they present retain a potent character in the
minds of jurists and defense attorneys.
Throughout the history of chance verdicts in California, the courts
have attempted to police the line between juror conduct that is acceptable
and juror conduct that must be addressed. Prying open the door of the jury
room is a titanic undertaking because misconduct is so hard to prove, and
because a judge must feel that the misconduct is so outrageous that it war-
rants the relaxing of one of the most fundamental rules in American juris-
prudence. But the California saga demonstrates that chance verdicts have a
long and tortured relationship with notions of justice. In the 1850s, judges
spoke in the language of order and sin. Chance verdicts were abdications of
a public responsibility. The newspapers treated the Legislature’s intrusion
in 1862 as a similar kind of corruption. As the nineteenth century ended, the
California courts began to speak in a new kind of language concerning
rights. The Reyes case continues that trend and proves that the issue is still
far from dead. Chance verdicts will continue to recur, and their history
268. Reyes v. Seifert, 125 F. App’x 788, 789 (9th Cir. 2005).
269. Id. at 789 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
270. He wrote:
California, however, has decided to strike a different balance between jury secrecy and
due process rights and allows jurors to testify about matters” within or without of the
jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.”
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1150 (2004). Therefore, unlike most chance verdict cases, in this
case there is admissible evidence to prove the claim. Juror F. admitted that he decided
the case according to two flips of a coin and that he therefore did not decide the case
solely on the evidence. Because Reyes supported his federal claim with admissible and
uncontroverted evidence, he should have received relief.
In sum, California’s rule of evidence concerning juror testimony allowed Reyes a practi-
cal means of proving his claim that a juror arrived at his guilty verdict by lot or chance.
Having done so entitled him to prevail on his due process claim. The right to a verdict
based on the evidence and not a coin flip is clearly established in law, though hardly
ever vindicated in practice. It should have been vindicated here.
Id. at 790 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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teaches that they present courts with some of the most complex and prob-
lematic issues for resolution. From this history, we can divine better means
of dealing with quotient and chance verdicts.
IV. “IN THE GRAVEST CASES”—LINKING HISTORY TO A SPECIFIC
STRATEGY FOR HANDLING CHANCE VERDICTS
Chance verdicts are not historical oddities—they are a necessary and
predictable consequence of cases where pressure on the jury is great. Alle-
gations of a chance verdict strike at the heart of the integrity of the jury
system. Even the United States Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
proves that our society is still debating the same questions about accessing
juries after verdicts as were judges hundreds of years ago.271 This paper has
proposed that “chance verdicts” should be further subdivided into four cate-
gories of jury misconduct. Working quotient verdicts and full quotient ver-
dicts without an agreement to be bound in advance pose the fewest
problems for jurists. This is because such verdicts are part of the give and
take that society hopes jurors will conduct as a proxy for the levelheaded,
common sense practicality of the community at its best. Full and partial
chance verdicts, where the jury employs chance to decide a case, pose the
most serious problems because the jury has not truly decided anything. This
paper has also posited that the most egregious species of chance verdict: (1)
tend to occur in communities experiencing upheaval; (2) arise where the
facts of the case are relatively clear; and (3) often create media firestorms
when news of the verdict breaks. To a trial judge considering whether to
admit evidence that a chance verdict has occurred, what guidance does his-
tory provide? In short, the history of chance verdicts demonstrates that the
law is denigrated when a full or partial chance verdict is exposed.
Where reliable evidence of a full or partial chance verdict is available,
due process demands that the door of the jury room open. Juries exercise
discretion on the public’s behalf—disputes must end, and parties must
move on. Perhaps a jury’s verdict will not be perfectly fair or will ignore
some class of evidence. But at some point, amidst the cross-currents of
legal thinking and philosophical wrangling, decisions must be made about
who wins cases and who must be separated from society. The decision to
confer that discretion on ordinary people is the most powerful endorsement
of democracy our society makes. We trust the jury to exercise discretion
fairly because we have no other choice. But when a jury fools with chance,
271. Compare Pen˜a-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017) (“The progress that
has already been made underlies the Court’s insistence that blatant racial prejudice is antithetical
to the functioning of the jury system and must be confronted in egregious cases like this one
despite the general bar of the no-impeachment rule.”), with id. at 884 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To-
day’s ruling will also prompt losing parties and their friends, supporters, and attorneys to contact
and seek to question jurors, and this pestering may erode citizens’ willingness to serve on
juries.”).
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it fundamentally destroys the relationship between society and the jury.
Even a jury that makes an unfair decision based on the evidence before it is
within the scope of our bargain with the jury system. A full or partial
chance verdict cannot stand because it negates the need for the legal pro-
cess. It distills discretion to the meanest and cruelest force: ungoverned fate.
It certainly violates basic notions of due process, including those held by
the state as an agent of the people in court.272 It certainly is not the trial by
jury spoken of in the Sixth Amendment.273 Chance is an outside force that
influences the jury to abandon their duty and their oaths. To tolerate a full
chance verdict in our courts is to surrender ourselves to the arbitrary rule of
something fundamentally outside a system of laws aspiring to justice. As
Justice Gorsuch has said, “Only a jury, acting on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, may take a person’s liberty. That promise stands as one of the Con-
stitution’s most vital protections against arbitrary government.”274
Our society’s commitment to and reliance on the jury system demands
that true “full” chance verdicts and even partial chance verdicts be vacated.
The history demonstrates that the exposure of chance verdicts denigrates
the integrity of the jury system in the eyes of the public. A verdict tainted
by chance loses legitimacy. Even in a case where the jury has resorted to
chance as a form of nullification (where a jury does not wish to decide the
case themselves), trial judges should begin their inquiries with an assump-
tion that an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to ensure honest verdicts.
In federal court, securing a hearing to evaluate (even reliable) evidence
of a chance verdict is difficult. But it can hardly be said that a full or partial
chance verdict comports with the basic promises of due process. Applying
the words of Justice Kennedy, these matters rise to the level of the “grav-
est” cases that the jury system sees.275 This is because, effectively, in a
chance verdict scenario, social pressure has overwhelmed jurors to the point
of incapacitation. The jury in Reyes ceased to be an effective organ in dis-
pensing anything like justice because but for chance, the deadlock would
have persisted. When a jury breaks down and resorts to chance, it is the
duty of the reviewing jurists to ensure that such a verdict does not stand. In
states where chance verdicts have been statutorily cemented as exceptions
272. Cf. Beakley v. Optimist Printing Co., 152 P. 212, 214 (Idaho 1915); Crabtree v. State, 35
Tenn. 302, 303 (1855) (discussing the right of the state to a fair jury verdict).
273. No matter the scope of the Sixth Amendment, the founders cannot have intended it be so
mean as to encompass the approval of a full chance verdict. Such a construction would render the
Amendment a nullity. Trial by chance verdict, though statistically “impartial,” would render the
“assistance of counsel for his defence” unnecessary. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
274. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019) (emphasis added); Pen˜a-Rodri-
guez, 137 S. Ct. at 861 (“Like all human institutions, the jury system has its flaws, yet experience
shows that fair and impartial verdicts can be reached if the jury follows the court’s instructions
and undertakes deliberations that are honest, candid, robust, and based on common sense.”).
275. Id. at 865–66.
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to the no-impeachment rule, state appellate courts must look to history in
assessing their options.
In states where chance verdicts have been statutorily or judicially ce-
mented as exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, it is crucial that state
appellate courts apply their laws. A breakdown in this process occurred in
Reyes when the courts treated the incident as a curiosity rather than simply
a new expression of a long-running phenomenon that courts have wrestled
with for centuries.
To that end, the court that finds itself facing allegations of a chance
verdict may employ the flowchart appended in Appendix A to ensure that
its decision to grant or deny a post-trial motion comports with the lessons
that the history teaches us: namely, that the narrative adopted by a commu-
nity in response to a chance verdict often matters more than the precise
legal norm violated by the jurors. Juror abdication to chance is a serious
problem that often goes unnoticed—but where it can be proven, it should.
These cases present grave issues of due process and evidentiary fairness,
and courts risk prejudicing litigants when they do not take allegations of a
chance verdict seriously. The schema in Appendix A is general—it does not
necessarily account for the precise ins and outs of the rules of each state.
The goal in articulating such a procedure is to place different chance meth-
ods along a continuum for courts to reference. Chance verdicts are not oddi-
ties—they are expressions of communities strained to the breaking point,
and it is at these outer edges of the jury system when the no-impeachment
rule should be suspect.
V. CONCLUSION
Chance verdicts pose unique challenges for trial judges and appellate
courts. Far from being a simple anomaly occasionally reported by a treatise,
chance verdicts tend to occur when specific circumstances are present.
When there is pressure on jurors, either from within or without, most juries
will be able to soldier through and render a decision without resorting to
misconduct. But for some juries, chance methods like quotients and coin
flipping seem fair in the moment. It is obviously impossible to assess how
often chance verdicts occur. If the jury remains silent, their misconduct is
undiscoverable. But when chance verdicts are discovered, they incite the
passions of the public and of judges. The questions they raise strike at the
heart of our deepest fears about the jury system.
An examination of example chance verdicts and the California pro-
gression shows that chance verdicts will likely recur simply because the
conditions that prompt them will recur. The California history also demon-
strates that if courts do not apply the same principles to each case, confu-
sion will ensue to the detriment of litigants who are entitled to a new trial
under the case law. Given the state of the media in the United States today,
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it is not difficult to imagine a new form of hybrid chance verdict arising and
being exposed to the public. The last thing the jury system needs is another
case that shakes the public’s faith in the judicial system and in the commu-
nity. Thus, it is imperative that courts keep this history of chance verdicts in
mind when confronting the next evidentiary challenge.
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APPENDIX C
B106911-NON-OP-1/11/00
(Opinion Re-Filed following granting of a Motion to Recall Remittitur)
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Appellant and defendant Isidro Samuel Reyes appeals from the judg-
ment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction on one
count of possession of cocaine base for sale.  (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11351.5; Pen. Code, § 1203.073, subd. (b)(5).)  Appellant was sentenced
to a total prison term of seven years.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
new trial based upon allegations of juror misconduct.  The motion was sup-
ported by statements from one juror that, outside the presence of the other
jurors, he had used a coin to assist him in deciding how to vote.  We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts.
On July 16, 1994, appellant was in the Mar Vista Housing Project in
Culver City.  When appellant saw a police officer approach, he threw
plastic bags onto the roof of a building.  The bags contained cocaine.  When
arrested, appellant had two $100 bills and two $20 bills.
* KLEIN, P. J. KITCHING, J. ALDRICH, J.
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2. Procedure.
In a bifurcated proceeding, appellant was convicted by jury of one
count of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11351.5) in an excess amount, within the meaning of Penal Code sec-
tion 1203.073, subdivision (b)(5).  Thereafter, the trial court found it true
that appellant had previously been convicted of a violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11351, within the meaning of Health and Safety Code
section 11370.2, subdivision (a).
Appellant was sentenced to a total prison term of seven years.
Appellant made a motion for a new trial.  The motion papers included
declarations from appellant’s trial counsel.  These declarations were filed
between November 28, 1995 and January 18, 1996.  In these declarations,
appellant’s trial counsel declared the following.  Trial concluded on No-
vember 7, 1995.  Jury deliberations lasted until 3 p.m. on November 9,
1995, at which time appellant was found guilty.  After the jury was ex-
cused, trial counsel had a conversation with Mr. Juan J., one of the jurors.
Another juror, Mr. Shakeed F., approached to discuss the case.  During this
conversation, Mr. Shakeed F. said he voted for guilt because he was pres-
sured into doing so and because it was his last day of jury service.  Mr.
Shakeed F. further stated that before lunch he was the only juror who did
not vote guilty.  After lunch Mr. Shakeed F. voted guilty because of pres-
sure from the other jurors.  Mr. Shakeed F. still believed appellant was not
guilty.
Appellant’s investigator declared Mr. Shakeed F. had also told the in-
vestigator about succumbing to pressure during deliberations.
On February 15, 1996, appellant’s counsel filed a supplemental decla-
ration.  Appellant’s counsel attested Mr. Shakeed F. had stated the follow-
ing.  Mr. Shakeed F.’s “vote of guilt was not based on his true belief . . . .
Despite [Mr. Shakeed F.’s] adamant position that [appellant] was not guilty,
he nevertheless voted with the rest of the jurors rather than run the risk of
further self-deprecation.”  Mr. Shakeed F. felt inferior and kept to himself.
“On the last day of deliberation two jurists felt that [appellant] was not
guilty.  The eleventh jurist ultimately sided with the other ten jurists leaving
[Mr. Shakeed F.] the lone hold-out.”  “Now, being the lone voice of inno-
cence created by the type of pressure which he could not tolerate.  At the
lunch break of the Friday on which the verdict was rendered [Mr. Shakeed
F.] went to his car to eat alone . . . .  He knew that he had to make a
decision one way or the other.  Yet, he still felt that [appellant] was not
guilty based on the evidence presented.  On the one hand he felt that he had
to arrive at a decision for the benefit of the other jurists, on the other hand
he did not agree with the guilty verdict.  [Mr. Shakeed F.] felt that the only
way out of this predicament was to flip a coin!!  Depending the side on
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which the coin fell determined whether he voted guilty or not guilty.”1
(Original emphasis.)
A hearing was held On February 23, 1996.  Mr. Shakeed F. was sworn
and testified to the following.  During the lunch break he was alone, in his
car.  He used the coin to assist him in a “corporate decision,” a “decision
not being biased.”  He decided that if the coin landed on heads, he would
vote “guilty.”  If the coin landed on tails, he would vote not guilty.  Since
the coin landed on heads, he flipped the coin again.  It landed on heads
again.  After lunch, he rejoined the other jurors.  They were waiting for his
decision, as the rest of the panel “knew which direction they were going.”
Earlier in the day, he had suggested the jury inform the trial court the jury
was hung, 11-1.  However, the other jurors requested he listen to what they
had to say.  After lunch, the jury was in the jury room for an hour and a
half.  The verdict was rendered, and the jury polled.  He voted guilty be-
cause he “went along with the flow.”  He talked to defense counsel after
trial and subsequently to an investigator.  However, he did not mention the
flipping the coin until months later.
The trial court asked for supplemental briefing.  In appellant’s supple-
mental briefs, appellant argued a chance verdict, such as flipping a coin,
constituted improper conduct warranting a new trial.
The People’s supplemental brief contended appellant had not met his
burden of proof.  The People suggested Mr. Shakeed F.’s testimony was not
credible because his statements were inconsistent, and he had not men-
tioned flipping the coin until months after the conviction.  The People also
argued that even if Mr. Shakeed F. used a coin in his thinking process, this
was not the decisive fact because Mr. Shakeed F. continued to deliberate
with the jurors for one and one-half hours after the coin was flipped.  The
People further agreed Mr. Shakeed F. simply was pressured into voting.
According to the People, the flip of the coin merely provided Mr. Shakeed
F. with a rationalization for succumbing to the pressure.
A declaration from juror Mr. David M. revealed the following.2  After
the verdict, Mr. Shakeed F. discussed the matter with appellant’s counsel.
Mr. Shakeed F. was profoundly affected when he heard appellant’s counsel
discuss “many points that were not brought out in the trial. . . .  [Mr.
Shakeed F.] seemed to be expressing doubts about his decision based on
this discussion.  The defense attorney’s points were interesting, provoca-
1. Appellant’s counsel referred to Mr. Shakeed F. as “Mr. Shaheed.”
2. The trial court permitted the prosecution to submit a letter which would be sent to jurors
asking for facts with regard to jury deliberations. The letter said in part, “[ ] told the Court that he
was the last juror to decide to vote guilty. We would like to know if [ ] returned from the lunch
break on the last day of the trial prepared to vote guilty, or instead, whether he changed his
position after the lunch break and following more deliberation.”  The record on appeal contains
information from only one juror in addition to that submitted  by Mr. Shakeed F.
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tive, and biased.  They should have been brought up in court if true .  [Mr.
Shakeed F.] seemed to accept them as facts.”
The trial court denied appellant’s motion for a new trial.  For purposes
of ruling on the motion, the trial court accepted the fact that Mr. Shakeed F.
flipped a coin and thus the trial court did not decide the issue on credibility.
The trial court concluded the situation was no different from cases in which
jurors changed their minds and there was an attempt to impeach the verdict
with evidence of those jurors’ subjective mental processes.  The trial court
ruled, “A coin toss for a single individual, which basically would indicate
there was no decision-making process going on, but it is the juror’s subjec-
tive process that we are looking into in evaluating the validity of this ver-
dict; and that is the area of inquiry which I think we are precluded in doing
as a matter of law.  [¶]  . . . .  [¶]  It would be peculiar to me that, if a juror
came back and said, ‘I only voted guilty because I was under pressure and I
wanted to go home and it was Friday’ that that would be invalid, and we
would be unable to review that verdict but, if a juror came in and said, ‘I
only voted guilty because I flipped a coin,’ that that one would be automati-
cally kicked out and the other we couldn’t even look at.  [¶]  It is one juror’s
effort to impeach the verdict based on their own decision-making process,
and that can’t be done.”  “Analytically, I don’t regard that as being any
different from ‘I did it because I was under pressure; I did it because I was
tired; I did it because I wanted to go home.  I did it for any other reason
other than an analysis of the evidence.’ ”
Appellant’s motion for reconsideration was denied.  He appeals from
the judgment.
DISCUSSION
The only issue raised is whether the flipping of a coin by Mr. Shakeed
F. constituted a chance verdict and thus the motion for a new trial should
have been granted.  We conclude there was no chance verdict.  Thus, the
trial court did not err in denying the new trial motion.
Evidence Code section 1150 states the general rule in California re-
garding the submission of juror affidavits to impeach a verdict.  Jurors are
competent to testify to objective facts occurring inside or outside the jury
room.  However, there can be no examination of juror’s mental processes.3
Verdicts cannot be upset by statements by individual jurors as to their mo-
tives and reasons for entering a particular vote.  This rule protects the final-
ity of verdicts and the sanctity of jury deliberations.  It is summarized in In
3. Evidence Code section 1150 reads:  “(a)  Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict,
any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions,
or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have
influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement,
conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.”
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re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391 at page 398:  “jurors may testify to
‘overt acts’ — that is, such statements, conduct, conditions, or events as are
‘open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus subject to corrobora-
tion’ — but may not testify to ‘the subjective reasoning processes of the
individual juror . . . .’  (People v. Hutchinson [(1969) 71 Cal.2d 342] 349-
350.)”
There are limited exceptions to the general rule prohibiting inquiry
into the minds of jurors.  One exception is that juries are not permitted to
decide a case by chance or lot.  (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 4; Code Civ.
Proc., § 657, subd. 2.)  Affidavits of jurors are admissible to overturn a
verdict to show a case was decided by tossing a coin, by drawing papers out
of a hat, as a result of a game of chance or by casting a die.  (People v. Hall
(1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 373, 380; People v. Richards (1905) 1 Cal.App.
566, 570; c.f. Wright v. Abbott (Mass. 1894) 36 N.E. 62 [ballots put in a
hat].)
A more sophisticated chance verdict device is the prohibited quotient
verdict where jurors agree to average their views.  It has been improperly
used by juries in civil cases to determine the amount of damages and in
criminal cases to determine the duration of a sentence or the amount of a
fine.4  (C.f. Chronakis v. Windsor (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1064-1068
[civil case]; Williams v. State (Ark. 1899) 50 S.W. 517, questioned in Lin
Manufacturing Company of Arkansas v. Courson (Ark. 1969) 436 S.W.2d
472, 474, [criminal case].)  A quotient verdict is one in which the jury
agrees that each individual will arrive at a verdict (e.g., a damage award),
the individual decisions will be added together, and then the total will be
divided by 12 to arrive at the quotient verdict.  However, there is no quo-
tient verdict if a similar procedure is followed, but there was no antecedent
agreement.  “[I]t is not improper for jurors to calculate an average amount
as a basis for discussion if there is a later consideration of the amount and a
vote upon it, even if they agree upon that amount.”  (Will v. Southern Pa-
cific Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 468, 478; Chronakis v. Windsor, supra, 14
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1064-1066, citing among others, Dixon v. Pluns (1893)
98 Cal. 384.)
Quotient verdicts, like other verdicts based on chance, are improper
because the jury agrees to a decision which is entirely uncertain and un-
known at the time the agreement is made, “as though the whole matter were
decided by the casting of a die, or the tossing of a coin.”  (Dixon v. Pluns,
supra, 98 Cal. at p. 387.)  Thus, if the mathematical computation is used
merely as a working tool and each juror thereafter independently agrees to
that result, there is no misconduct.  (City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist
Church (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 384, 433-435; Balkwill v. City of Stockton
4. In California, sentences are determined by the court.
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(1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 661, 671-672, distinguished on other grounds in
Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 831.)
In some cases discussing verdicts by lot or chance, there is a dispute as
to whether or not there was an antecedent agreement and the influence of
that agreement on one or more jurors.  In those cases, some jurors attest that
the verdict was based upon a mathematical formula, while other jurors at-
test the formula was used merely as a tool to assist in the decisionmaking
process.  If a juror believed there was an agreement and was induced to
assent to the verdict because of that belief, some courts conclude the verdict
must be reversed.  (E.g., Gordon v. Trevarthan (Mont. 1893) 34 P. 185
[discussing a statute virtually identical to Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 657].)  Others conclude reversal is not required.  (E.g., Maryland Casu-
alty Co. v. Gideon (Tex.Civ.App. 1948) 213 S.W.2d 848, 851 [one juror
assented to verdict because he believed there was an agreement to be
bound; “there was no overt act of misconduct and such testimony could
merely constitute the mental process by which [one juror] arrived at the
verdict and is insufficient to destroy it.”].)  The only decision we have
found in California which touched this point is Levy v. Brannan (1870) 39
Cal. 485.  In Levy, it appears a portion of the jury agreed to fix damages by
a resort to chance.  The verdict was set aside because a portion of the jurors
were “induced to assent to a verdict . . . by drawing lots.”  (Id. at p. 489.)5
Penal Code section 1181 permits the trial court in criminal cases to
grant a new trial “[w]hen the verdict has been decided by lot, or by any
means other than a fair expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors[.]”
(Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 4.)  Code of Civil Procedure section 657 also
codifies California’s prohibition of chance verdicts and specifically permits
the testimony of one juror to be used as evidence to prove the verdict was
arrived in such a manner.  Code of Civil Procedure section 657 is more
detailed than its criminal counterpart and states in pertinent part:  “The ver-
dict may be vacated and  . . . a new or further trial granted on all or part of
the issues . . . for any of the following causes, materially affecting the sub-
stantial rights of such party:
“................................................................................................................
“2.  Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the
jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the
5. The focus on an individual juror arises in one other related arena. To reverse after jury
misconduct has been found, prejudice must be shown. (In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 963;
People v. Perez (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 893, 906.)  In discussing prejudice, courts state that “[w]hen
the misconduct in question supports a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that at least one
juror was impermissibly influenced to the [detriment of the party alleging error], we are compelled
to conclude that the integrity of the trial was undermined: under such circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the jury was impartial.”  (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 951; In re
Malone, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 963-964.)
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determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of
any one of the jurors.”
There does not appear to be a difference between a “verdict . . . de-
cided by lot” as used in Penal Code section 1181 and the “resort to the
determination of chance” as specified in Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 657.  There are few criminal cases discussing the subject and these
cases use the terms together, as if they were interchangeable.  The criminal
cases have little discussion and usually simply state verdicts by chance or
lot are not permitted, or the facts presented in that case do not constitute a
verdict by chance or lot.  (E.g., People v. Kromphold (1916) 172 Cal. 512,
524-525; People v. Soap (1899) 127 Cal. 408, 411; People v. Azoff (1895)
105 Cal. 632, 634, distinguished in People v. Hutchinson, supra, 71 Cal.2d
at pp. 347-348; People v. Richards, supra, 1 Cal.App. at p. 570.)  Also, the
Civil Code provision has been applied in criminal cases.  (E.g., People v.
Sherman (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 245, 256; People v. Azoff, supra, 105 Cal.
at p. 635.)  Further, differences in the two statutes appear to be insignifi-
cant.  For example, even though Penal Code section 1181 does not explic-
itly state juror(s) affidavits may be used to prove a decision was by chance
or lot, while the civil code is explicit in this regard, other authorities makes
this point in a criminal context.  (Evid. Code, § 1150; People v. Hall, supra,
108 Cal.App.3d at p. 380; People v. Cook, (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d  442,
446.)
Here, appellant contends there was a chance verdict because one juror,
Mr. Shakeed F., tossed a coin.  Appellant focuses on the language in Civil
Code section 657 which states a new trial may be granted when “one or
more jurors have been induced to assent . . . by a resort to the determination
of chance”.  By focusing on this language, however, appellant misses the
mark and demonstrates a misunderstanding of the basic premise of a
“chance verdict” or a “verdict by lot.”  Such verdicts result from the jury’s
agreement in advance to be bound by a result reached by a methodology
which resorts to chance.6  (Sunset Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Miles (Tex.Civ.App.
1968) 430 S.W.2d 388, 392.)  A verdict by chance or lot does not refer to
the mental processes of one juror, in isolation from his or her fellow jurors.
If the jury panel uses some tool, such as a coin, the roll of a dice, or a
mathematical formula, to assist it in reaching a conclusion, but there was no
antecedent agreement to use that result as the verdict, there is no impropri-
ety.  If there is no antecedent agreement, the verdict was not a “verdict by
chance or lot.”
Even in situations discussing the impact of one or more jurors being
“induced to assent” by the chance methodology, there is no dispute that
either the entire jury panel or a portion of the panel agreed to use a chance
6. “Chance” has been defined as “hazard, risk, or the result or issue of uncertain and un-
known conditions or forces.”  (Dixon v. Pluns, supra, 98 Cal. 384 at p. 387.)
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methodology in the decisionmaking process.  The only evidence before us
is that one juror used a verdict to assist him in his decisionmaking process.
There are no facts before us which show there was an agreement among the
jurors to abide by the toss of a coin or Mr. Shakeed F. believed there was an
agreement to be bound by a coin toss.7
Here, one juror used a coin toss to assist him in voting.  It appears this
aided his decision to give into the majority.  Deciding to acquiesce to the
vote of the majority does not result in a chance verdict.  (Cf. People v.
Sherman, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d at pp. 256-257; People v. Cook, supra, 136
Cal.App.2d at p. 446 [juror succumbing to pressures does not violate Penal
Code section 1181, subd. 4].)8  Further, after flipping the coin, Mr. Shakeed
F. rejoined the rest of the jury and deliberations continued for another one
and one-half hours.  Additional deliberations demonstrate the vote was in-
dependent of the coin toss.  Thus, the information contained in the motion
for new trial reveals Mr. Shakeed F.’s mental processes.  The information
reflects on his subjective concerns and the mental processes he used to
overcome those concerns.
While the method used by Mr. Shakeed F. may be disturbing, and is
indeed unorthodox, it does not constitute a chance verdict or one deter-
mined by lot.  Were we to examine Mr. Shakeed’s reasons for voting, we
would be probing the mental processes of this one juror, something which
we are prohibited from doing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
7. Since the trial court did not decide the case based upon the credibility of Mr. Shakeed F.,
we have no reason to discuss situations in which affidavits are not believed or there are contradic-
tory affidavits. (E.g. Bunker v. City of Glendale (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 325, 329.)
8. We have found few cases which deal with verdicts based upon flipping of a coin. (Vaise
v. Delaval (1785 K.B.) 1 T.R. 11 [99 Eng.Rep.944].)
Schwindt v. Graeff (Ohio 1924) 142 N.E. 736 involved a situation in which one juror tossed a coin
to assist that juror in making a decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded the judgment
could not be set aside because jurors’ declarations were not admissible, noted the case strained the
general rule to the breaking point, and suggested the legislature could enact laws to modify or
abrogate that rule. There was no statute permitting misconduct be proven by affidavit and there
was no discussion as to whether the juror’s act constituted a chance verdict.
In Crawford v. Consolidated Underwriters (Tex.Civ.App. 1959) 323 S.W.2d 657, the jury was
deadlocked on whether plaintiff should receive $1,250 or $1,450. To resolve the impasse, the jury
“agreed to flip a coin and abide the result.”  (Id. at p. 658.)  Thereafter, the jury answered the
issues in a manner which would entitle plaintiff to that amount. Acknowledging the agreement to
abide by the toss of a coin was flagrant misconduct, the court refused to reverse the judgment on
that ground because plaintiff benefited from that position. (Id. at 659.)  The court held, however, it
was reversible error to answer the questions in a manner consistent with that flip. (Id. at p. 659.)
